Western New England Law Review
Volume 28 28 (2005-2006)
Issue 2

Article 2

12-16-2009

DIVERSITY'S DIVERGENCE: A POSTGRUTTER EXAMINATION OF RACIAL
PREFERENCES IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
Lorin J. Lapidus

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Lorin J. Lapidus, DIVERSITY'S DIVERGENCE: A POST-GRUTTER EXAMINATION OF RACIAL PREFERENCES IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT, 28 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 199 (2006), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

DIVERSITY'S DIVERGENCE: A POST
GRUTTER EXAMINATION OF RACIAL
PREFERENCES IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
LORIN

J.

LAPIDus*

INTRODUCTION

In The Odyssey, Homer wrote,
I, she said, was to listen to thern, but you rnust tie me
hard in hurtful bonds, to hold rne fast in position
upright against the rnast, with the ropes' ends fastened around it;
but if I supplicate you and implore you to set rne
free, then you rnust tie rne fast with even rnore lashings.
So they sang, in sweet utterance, and the heart within me
desired to listen, and I signaled my cornpanions to set me
free, nodding with rny brows, but they leaned on and rowed hard
1

In these famous lines, the self-constraint Odysseus imposes on him
self with the collective agreement of his shipmates reflects a distinct
sense of rationality and pre-commitment in the face of a future that
is unpredictable and dangerous. This is the essence of American
constitutional jurisprudence. Just as Odysseus had his hands bound
to the mast, we are bound to the rule of law as embodied in the
United States Constitution.
To many, the Republic's constitutional commitment to the text
and manifest purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro
tection Clause, which is to eliminate intentional racial discrimina
tion, was fundamentally challenged by the United States Supreme
Court decision in Gruffer v. Bollinger. 2 This long anticipated deci
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1. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER 189-90 (Richmond Lattimore trans., Harper
Row 1977).
2. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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sion opened an ominous gateway to a postmodern legal order
where de jure racial discrimination has become institutionalized in
a new form and with a new name, at least within the peripatetic
haven of university life. Grutter has established the concept of ra
cial diversity as a compelling state interest in public education. Fol
lowing the Grutter decision, it is possible that the diversity rationale
could reach into other areas of law, such as public employment.
The likelihood of the diversity rationale extending into the
public employment context, as well as a critique of the diversity
justification itself, is the central focus of this article. Part I describes
the socio-political history of affirmative action in the United States
from the Republic's inception through the modern era. Part II
traces the constitutional trajectory of racial preferences in the edu
cational context, culminating with Grutter v. Bollinger in 2003. Part
III discusses the important trends in the pre-Grutter line of reme
dial affirmative action cases in the public employment context. Part
IV examines the case law from the federal district and appellate
courts that have applied Grutter in the public employment context.
Finally, Part V offers predictions regarding the expansion of Grut
ter's diversity rationale into public employment and evaluates
whether the diversity rationale is appropriate in the public employ
ment context. This article concludes that a close reading of Grutter
v. Bollinger and the initial approaches taken by the lower federal
courts indicates that it is unlikely the diversity rationale will extend
far into the public employment context. The article argues that this
result is entirely appropriate and consistent with the nation's socio
economic and moral traditions.
I.

THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL BACKDROP OF
INSTITUTIONALIZED RACIAL PREFERENCES

The U.S. Constitution as first ratified in 1787 was a color-con
scious document. For example, African slaves were not recognized
citizens for representation purposes. Rather, a slave was counted as
"three fifths" of a person. 3 Stripped of personhood and citizenship,
a slave was constitutionally protected property. The 1787 Constitu
tion further provided,
No person held to service or Labour in one state, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law
or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or La
3.

U.S.

CONST.

art. I, § 2, d. 3, repealed by U.S.

CONST.

amend. XIV.
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bour, but shall be delivered upon Claim of the Party to whom
such Service or Labor may be due."4

The importation of slaves was permitted until 1808.5
The Republic's endorsement of slavery served as a barrier to
national unity and tarnished the enlightenment principles of the
Declaration of Independence. 6 While tenets of dual federalism
may have been the articulated rationale for the secession of South
Carolina in 1861, the institution of slavery served as the catalyst for
the Civil War. 7 The constitutional protection and displacement of
civil liberties based on an individual's race nearly caused the physi
cal destruction of the Union. 8
With the legal institution of slavery prohibited by the Thir
teenth Amendment in 1865, the Republic made a conscious deci
sion to amend the Constitution to ensure that no state may "deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."9
The primary goal of the Fourteenth Amendment was to create a
framework for governance that no longer recognized race as a legit
imate means of distributing constitutional burdens and benefits.1O
Despite the new Amendment, discrimination continued to emanate
through southern life. Jim Crow laws intentionally discriminated
against the newly freed slaves by disallowing material integration
into general society.1 1 Blacks were disenfranchised by the imposi
tion of insurmountable barriers, such as the grandfather clause and
the literacy test for suffrage,12 Thus, violation of constitutional pro
tections and displacement of civil liberties on the basis of an indi
vidual's race continued. However, while this color-consciousness
did not cause the physical destruction of the Union, it did, perhaps
more harmfully, result in the moral destruction of Fourteenth
4.
5.
6.

U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST.. amend. XIV.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1, repealed in 1808.
1 ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITs ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT 241 (7th ed. 1991).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. See id.
11. KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 146-47
(1989).
12. Id. Both the literacy test and grandfather clause operated to greatly reduce if
not practically eliminate the ability of the newly freed slaves to vote. Id. While literacy
tests required potential voters to read sections of fairly esoteric historical or literary
material, the grandfather clause mandated that, to qualify as a voter, a potential voter's
grandfather must have been a registered voter. Id.
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Amendment Equal Protection Clause by failing to safeguard the
very principle it was created to advance.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court adopted the color-con
scious ideology with its approval of the separate-but-equal doctrine
in Plessy v. FergusonP Despite this constitutional setback, Justice
John Marshall Harlan offered a glimmer of hope in his dissenting
opinion when he articulated his disapproval of the protection of
rights based on race. 14 Justice Harlan wrote, "But in view of the
Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no supe
rior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our
Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens."15 Ultimately, Justice Harlan's imagery of the col
orblind Constitution stands for the premise that civil liberties may
not be protected, advanced, or inhibited on the basis of a citizen's
race. 16 This learned principle finally came to constitutional fruition
in Brown v. Board of EducationP After nearly six decades, the
hostility of the Jim Crow era finally faded into the dark annals of
American constitutional history.1 8 Brown represented the proposi
tion that black students' educational rights, and civil liberties in
general, could no longer be disadvantaged because of their race,
nor could white students' rights continue to be advanced because of
their race. 19 Chief Justice Warren wrote, "Today, education ... per
haps [one of] the most important functions of state and local gov
ernment ... is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms."20
Nevertheless, some endings fail to represent new beginnings.
The counter-culture resistance of the 1960s rejected many of the
values of equality established during the previous decade. 21 The
loss of trust in government, intensified by Vietnam and Watergate,
caused Americans to be wary of official motives. 22 Moreover,
groundbreaking events such as James Meredith's attempt to enter
the University of Mississippi amid a flurry of racial hysteria forever
163 u.S. 537, 544, 551-52 (1896).
Id. at 559.
Id.
See id.
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. [d.
21. 2 ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE American Constitution: Its Origins and De
velopment 598, 612 (7th ed. 1991).
22. Id.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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changed both the moral and constitutional trajectory of American
society.23 It was during this era that the focus on liberty and equal
ity of rights, foundational principles of the Republic, and the Four
teenth Amendment was replaced with the equality plus paradigm. 24
With equality plus, the Constitution's once paramount negative lib
erties, enshrined in the Bill of Rights and the Civil War Amend
ments, were to morph into affirmative entitlements and special
privileges. 25 Equality plus then administered these entitlements
and privileges to the descendants of historically disadvantaged citi
zens based on immutable characteristics such as race.
The term affirmative action appeared officially for the first
time in 1935 in the National Labor Relations Act. 26 The term be
gan to take on its more contemporary meaning in 1961, even before
the 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed. 27 President Kennedy issued
Executive Order 10925, which went far beyond prohibiting discrim
ination. 28 Executive Order 10925 required federal contractors to
take affirmative action to ensure that applicants were employed and
treated fairly during the term of their employment.29 An Executive
Order promulgated by President Johnson in 1965 broadened the
Kennedy Order by creating the Office of Federal Contract Compli
ance, which monitored the participation levels of minorities and
women and developed timetables for the prompt creation of equal
employment opportunity.3D Finally, under the Nixon Administra
tion, Revised Order 4 required contractors to add minorities and
women to their affirmative action plans and develop goals for cor
recting deficiencies. 31
23. LEE EpSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANG·
ING AMERICA: RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND JUSTICE 391-92 (3d ed. 1998).
24. 2 KELLY ET AL., supra note 21, at 609 (stating that official evenhandedness is
not enough and government must take an affirmative role in leveling the playing field
for minorities by providing racial preferences in state-created educational and employ
ment opportunities).
25. See Patricia A. Cain, The Right to Privacy under the Montana Constitution:
Sex and Intimacy, 64 MONT. L. REV. 99, 127 (2003) (explaining that negative liberty is
simply the right to be free from government intrusion and regUlation).
26. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.c. §§ 151-169 (2000»; see
Martha West, The Historical Roots of Affirmative Action, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 607, 611-12
(1998) (explaining that if an employer violates the NLRA by discriminating against an
employee for concerted union activity, the NLRB remedies the violation by ordering
the employer to take "affirmative action," including reinstatement and/or back pay).
27. West, supra note 26, at 613-14.
28. Exec. Order No. 10,925,26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 8, 1961).
29. Id. at §§ 301-302.
30. West, supra note 26, at 613-14.
31. Id. at 614.
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The scope of affirmative action, or taking race or gender into
account when making employment decisions, was broadened in the
1970s in the field of student admissions. 32 The Department of
Housing, Education, and Welfare amended its regulations imple
menting Title VI, which provides that there shall be no discrimina
tion in federally funded educational institutions. 33 The regulations
instructed institutions to consider race to overcome low minority
enrollment. 34 The American Association of Law Schools recog
nized in the 1960s that "there was a long tradition of separateness
between the [top] schools" in the nation, which attempted to pre
serve Anglo-Saxon Protestant domination of the legal profession,
and the poorer schools, which accepted large numbers of socio-eco
nomically disadvantaged students. 35 Racial preferences were seen
as a way to level the field of competition and create new educa
tional opportunities for minorities. 36

II.

NAVIGATING THE CHOPPY WATERS OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL TRAJECTORY

A.

Bakke's Legacy: The Great Battle of the Circuits

The Supreme Court's first consideration of racial preferences
in the context of public university admissions came in a 4-1-4 split
opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.37 In
Bakke, the Court considered whether the University of California
at Davis Medical School's dual admissions policy complied with the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 8 The ad
missions policy set quotas to ensure a certain number of seats for
minority applicants. 39 Although all applicants were judged pursu
ant to the same characteristics, minority applicants competed only
against each other before a special minority admissions committee
for a predetermined number of places in the incoming class. 40
32. Id. at 619.
33. 37 Fed. Reg. 24,686-24,696 (Nov. 18, 1972).
34. Id.
35. Anthony 1. Scanlon, The History and Culture of Affirmative Action, 1988
B.Y.U. L. REV. 343, 345 (1988).
36. Frank Rene Lopez, Pedagogy on Teaching Race and Law: Beyond "Talk
Show" Discussions, 10 TEX. HISP. 1. L. & POL'y 39, 44 (2004).
37. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
38. Id. at 269-70.
39. Ed. at 275-76.
40. Ed. at 274-75.
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Justice Powell, providing the swing vote for the use of strict
scrutiny, announced the Court's puzzling judgment. The plurality
found the affirmative action program unconstitutional as a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. 41 Surviving strict scrutiny review
requires that the University's consideration of race serve a compel
ling state interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that inter
est. 42 The plurality held that although racial diversity could be a
compelling state interest because a diverse student body contributes
to the robust exchange of ideas,43 the strict quota policy was not a
narrowly tailored means to achieve the objective of diversity.44
Justice Powell articulated that "race or ethnic background may
be deemed 'a plus'" in weighing the many factors in favor of an
applicant.45 Justice Powell pointed to a model program existing at
Harvard University as the paradigm for the affirmation of his analy
sis.46 While Justice Powell wrote that "'societal discrimination'
does not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon
persons ... who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the bene
ficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have suf
fered," he also envisioned a future in which the "robust exchange"
of ideas of diverse groups will advance the cause of academia. 47 A
fair reading of Bakke still seems to affirm the supremacy of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a shield rather than a sword. 48 Bakke
represents the crossroads between the remedial and diversity mod
41. Id. at 320.
42. Id. at 299.
43. Id. at 312.
44. See id. at 319-20.
45. Id. at 312.
46. Id. at 316; see Suzanne E. Eckes, Race-Conscious Admissions Programs:
Where do Universities Go From Gratz and Grutter?, 33 J. L. & EDUC. 21, 25 (2004)
(explaining that the Harvard Plan is a holistic model that considers race as one "plus"
factor among many different considerations that could include geography or personal
experiences when evaluating potential candidates for students in educational institu
tions). But see Alan M. Dershowitz & Laura Hanft, Affirmative Action and the Harvard
College Diversity-Discretion Model: Paradigm or Pretext?, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 379,
385-90 (1979) (noting that the Harvard Plan had its genesis as a Jewish quota designed
to achieve a better reflection of the nation's population by limiting the number of Jew
ish students attending Harvard).
47. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310-12 (quoting Keyishan v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967».
48. See generally Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution
as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1533-34 (1972) (explaining that the constitution
may be used as a shield by providing protection from the arbitrary exercise of state
power, while the constitution as sword concept envisions constitutional provisions that
appear to prohibit state action to go one step further and permit affirmative remedies
for constitutional violations).
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els, in which the Court tries to establish its own footing with respect
to the priority of remedial interests, societal discrimination and
diversity.49
Nonetheless, the only clear consequence of Bakke is confusion
in the federal circuits since it was decided in 1978. In the several
years following Bakke, a deep ideological rift developed between
the Fifth Circuit in Texas and the Sixth Circuit in Michigan over the
use of race in the admissions decisions of each state's law schools.
In Hopwood v. State of Texas, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
Bakke was not binding because Justice Powell's decision did not
represent a majority, and held that the University of Texas School
of Law discriminated in favor of minority applicants by giving them
a substantial racial preference in its admissions program. 50 In prac
tice, the University of Texas treated a special group of minorities,
particularly African and Mexican Americans, differently than all
other candidates. 51 In fact, African and Mexican Americans were
placed on entirely separate admission tracks where lower standards
were acceptable for admission. 52 The minimum Texas Index (TI)
admission score for resident whites and non-preferred minorities
was 199, while "Mexican Americans and blacks needed a TI of only
189 to be presumptively admitted."53 As a result, the Texas admis
sion program would admit "a minority candidate with a TI of 189
... even though his score was considerably below the level at which
a white candidate almost certainly would be rejected."54 Therefore,
the separate admission criteria created a substantial racial prefer
ence and a dual admission standard. 55 Although no positions were
set aside or reserved, the purpose of lower standards was, as the
University of Texas described it, "to meet 'an aspiration' of admit
ting a class consisting of 10% Mexican Americans and 5% Black."56
The court noted, "The central purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause 'is to prevent states from purposefully discriminating be
tween individuals on the basis of race."'57 Applying strict scrutiny,
49. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310-12 (quoting Keyishan v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967».
50. Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944, 965 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated by
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003).
51. Id. at 936.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 937.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 939-40 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993».
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the Hopwood court ruled that "any consideration of race or ethnic
ity by the law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student
body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amend
ment. "58 The court reasoned that such consideration "frustrates,
rather than facilitates, the goals of equal protection" by perpetuat
ing improper stereotypes. 59 The court viewed "modern equal pro
tection doctrine as recognizing only one compelling state interest
... : remedying the effects of de jure racial discrimination. "60 In
essence, a compelling state interest may not be used to remedy gen
eral societal biases and private actions that have no nexus to state
action. 61 Hence, to satisfy strict scrutiny, the Hopwood court would
have had to find that the law school was a de jure discriminator and
that there were present effects of past discrimination. 62 The Hop
wood court found no such evidence. 63
In addressing the diversity rationale, the court stated that the
rationale fosters rather than minimizes racial inequality by "treating
minorities as a group, rather than as individuals."64 The Fifth Cir
cuit panel reasoned that the diversity rationale promoted improper
stereotypes through the belief that a person's race controls his point
of view. 65 The court deemed the diversity model irrational because
it was synonymous with choosing applicants "based upon the physi
cal size or blood type."66 In the end, the Fifth Circuit viewed the
diversity rationale as a self-defeating mechanism that thwarts the
goal of ending racially motivated state action. 67
A few years after the Fifth Circuit decided Hopwood, the Su
preme Court encountered another law school affirmative action
plan, this one developed in Michigan. 68 Grutter v. Bollinger would
finally allow the Supreme Court to revisit the issues considered in
Bakke and announce a rule that either supported or weakened the
controversial 4-1-4 split. Grutter began when a white female from
Michigan with a 3.8 GPA and a 161 LSAT score was denied admis
58. Id. at 944.
59. Id. at 945.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 952.
63. Id. at 955.
64. Id. at 944-45.
65. Id. at 946.
66. Id. at 945.
67. /d. at 947-48.
68. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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sion to the Law Schoo1. 69 The University of Michigan claimed to
evaluate the totality of the applicant.7° The admissions policy mea
sured "hard factors" such as GPA and LSAT scores as well as per
sonal statements and letters of recommendation.71 The policy also
evaluated "soft factors," including the quality of the undergraduate
institution, the difficulty of the major, the enthusiasm of the recom
mender and, most controversially, race.7 2 The University of Michi
gan asserted its "longstanding commitment to 'one particular type
of diversity,' racial and ethnic diversity, with special reference to
the inclusion of students from groups which have been historically
disadvantaged, specifically African Americans and Hispanics. "73
The University's rationale for taking racial preferences into consid
eration during the admissions process was "to 'achieve that diver
sity which has the potential to enrich everyone's education and thus
make a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts.' "74
To achieve this objective, the University reserved a range or
group of seats of an unspecified amount for racial minorities, which
it called a "critical mass."75 It believed that a critical mass of mi
nority students was essential to the law school because it added a
unique character to the student body.76 The Director of Admis
sions frequently consulted daily reports on the racial makeup of the
incoming class and informed admissions workers how close they
were to assembling the critical mass of minority students. 77 Michi
gan defined "critical mass" as a "meaningful number," that is, "a
number that encourages underrepresented minority students to
participate in the classroom and not feel isolated. "78 The Director
of Admissions testified that if she could not consider the race of the
applicant, a critical mass of minority students would not be
achieved by considering LSAT scores and undergraduate GPA
alone.79 The difference between a quota and a critical mass appears
to be that a quota is an officially predetermined, announced num
ber, such as 10%. In contrast, a critical mass is an unannounced
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

77.
78.

79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

316.
314-15.
315.
315-16.
316.
315 (citation omitted).
316.
315-16.
318.
318-19.
318.
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target percentage or range that varies between two reasonably close
outer limits, such as between 9% and 12%. A quota and a previ
ously undetermined critical mass appear to be functional
equivalents. 8o
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit applied strict scrutiny and held
that the University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy was
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest in achieving a di
verse student body.81 Unlike the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood, the
Sixth Circuit in Grutter felt bound by stare decisis: it had to follow
Justice Powell's decision in Bakke because his opinion provided the
narrowest support for the Court's judgment.82 The Grutter opinion
focused on the notion that when race is used as a plus, it enhances
diversity because "a 'black student can often bring something [to
the university] that a white person cannot offer.' "83 In addition, the
Sixth Circuit opined that the Michigan plan was drafted to comply
with Bakke because the critical mass application was not a quota in
that the applicants were treated as individuals and all pertinent ele
ments of diversity were taken into consideration. 84
B.

The O'Connor Factor: The High Court Endorses the Diversity
Rationale in Education

Grutter v. Bollinger finally made it to the Supreme Court. 85 In
the end, as many keen Court watchers had predicted, Justice
O'Connor lived up to her recent reputation of siding with the so
cially progressive members of the Court on highly charged individ
ual rights issues. 86 Justice O'Connor was the deciding vote on the
question whether racial diversity is a compelling state interest. 87
She decided that it is a compelling state interest, and that, when
achieved through the critical mass model, an affirmative action plan
80. See id. at 378-79 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 742, 748 (6th Cir. 2002).
82. Id. at 742. The court applied the rule providing that "'[w]hen a fragmented
court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five Justices, the holding of the court may be viewed as that position taken by those
members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.'" Id. at 739 (citing
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977».
83. Id. at 746 (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 744-47.
85. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
86. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000) (holding that Ne
braska's Partial Birth Abortion statute was unconstitutional because it imposed an un
due burden on a woman's right to have an abortion).
87. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
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survives constitutional review. 88
The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 majority, endorsed the Bakke
plurality's view that student body diversity is a compelling state in
terest that can justify the use of racial preferences in university ad
missions. 89 This decision was based on the Court's finding that
diversity "helps to break down racial stereotypes" as well as to en
lighten and liven classroom discussion.9° By accepting this view, the
majority applied an unprecedented version of strict scrutiny, water
ing the standard down to little more than rational basis review. Jus
tice O'Connor set this tone by deciding that strict scrutiny must
take context into consideration in a significant way.91 Thus, in
Grutter, strict scrutiny included a good-faith reliance on the "educa
tional judgment" of the school "that diversity is essential to its edu
cational mission."92 Part of the law school's compelling interest was
assuring that minority students have a place within the student
body.93 This was especially important because minority students
were "less likely to be admitted in meaningful numbers on [the ba
sis of their LSAT scores and undergraduate GPA alone]."94
Next, the Grutter majority analyzed the critical mass system
under the second prong of the strict scrutiny test. The Court found
that the University's system was narrowly tailored to achieve racial
diversity in the higher education setting, the compelling state inter
est first announced in Bakke.95 While the Court held that a fixed
numerical quota is unconstitutional, it accepted the concept of a
critical mass. 96 Justice O'Connor ruled that an impermissible quota
exists where a fixed number of seats are reserved exclusively for
minority students, but explained that "'[slome attention to num
bers,' without more, does not transform a flexible admissions sys
tem into a rigid quota."97 Consequently, the Court endorsed the
state's right to reserve seats for minority students, to form a critical
mass, so long as the institution does not announce beforehand ex
actly how many seats or precisely what percentage of the class the
critical mass will make up in a particular year. The University of
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
See id. at 327-28.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 327.
See id. at 328.
See id. at 338.
Id.
Id. at 334; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335-36.
Id. at 336.
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Michigan's critical mass concept appears to have survived strict
scrutiny because the admissions committee stated that it evaluates
all factors, including race, that contribute to student body diver
sity.98 In practice, the institution can adhere to an unfixed range of
minority applicants, for example, between X% and Y% of African
Americans. In short, the means are permissible as long as the insti
tution does not pre-announce a fixed number, and promises to look
at all factors in the admissions equation to reach its goal of achiev
ing a diverse student body.
The Supreme Court proceeded with its unusual deference to
the university under the strict scrutiny analysis by articulating that
"[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceiva
ble race-neutral alternative," including lowering standards for en
trance, but merely requires a "serious, good faith consideration of
workable race-neutral [methods] that will achieve the diversity the
university seeks."99 The Court also upheld the Law School's pro
gram despite its lack of a sunset provision. lOo It took "the Law
School at its word that it ... will terminate [the] race-conscious[]
program as soon as practicable. "101 The Court stated in dicta that it
expected that in twenty-five years, the use of racial preferences
would no longer be necessary to further the interest of racial
diversity.l02
III.

THE REMEDIAL FRAMEWORK OF AFFIRMATIVE AcnON IN
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT: FROM WYGANT103

TO ADARAND l04

A.

Case Law Analysis

The development of racial preferences in public employment
began in 1986 with the members of the High Court sparring over
the meaning of equality.lOS For the next several years, opinions rid
dled with pluralities and, consequently, uncertainties, fostered con
fusion regarding the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 336-37.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 343, 341-42 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)).
Id. at 343.
See id. (implying that racial diversity will still be a compelling state interest).
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 267.
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affirmative action in public employment. 106 Led many times by the
newly appointed Justice O'Connor, the Court tried to establish
equilibrium within the American common law. 107 The fundamental
ideological debate centered on the nature of the discrimination it
self, and against whom the discrimination was directed. 10s While
some Justices deemed benign discrimination a permissible method
of fostering equality, other Justices felt that attempting to force
equality through inequality was self-defeating. 109 Ultimately, in
1989, and again in 1995, the Court respectively adopted and reaf
firmed the strict scrutiny test as the constitutionally correct level of
review in so-called benign discrimination cases. 110 However, the
path from Wygant to Adarand with its many concurrences and dis
sents leaves two fundamental issues still somewhat uncertain: (1)
how rigorously will strict scrutiny actually be applied; and (2) are
there any non-remedial purposes, such as racial diversity as recog
nized in the educational context in Grutter, that can serve as a com
pelling state interest in the context of public employment?
1.

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, Justice Powell led
the plurality in announcing a framework that addressed what can,
and more notably what cannot constitute a compelling state interest
under strict scrutiny in the public employment context. 111 Wygant
considered the issue of "whether a school board . . . may extend
preferential protection against layoffs to [minority teachers]" in ac
cordance with the Equal Protection Clause. 11z A provision in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Jackson School
Board and its teachers "protect[ed] employees who were members
of certain minority groups" from being laid off.1 13 The provision
created a statistical model that commanded the board not to layoff
a greater percentage of minority teachers than were currently work
106. Compare Wygant, 476 U.S. at 267, and Metro Broad. Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547, 566 (1990), with Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 200.
107. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 204; City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 476 (1989).
108. 1.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see id. at 527
(Scalia, J., concurring).
109. See id. at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 493-94 (majority opinion); Adarand Constructors Inc., 515 U.S. at 227.
111. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-76.
112. Id. at 269-70.
113. Id. at 270.
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ing for the board at the time. 1l4 Thereafter, the non-minority
teachers brought an Equal Protection action in federal district
court, where the program was upheld. 1l5 Applying rational basis,
the court reasoned that no finding of prior discrimination was re
quired and that the goal of providing role models for young minor
ity students was sufficient to uphold the layoff provision. 1l6
On review, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's af
firmation of the district court's ruling. 117 The plurality began by
noting "that the level of scrutiny does not change merely because
the challenged classification operates against a group that histori
cally has not been subject to governmental discrimination."1l8
Even though the discriminatory classification operates against
whites, it is nevertheless a classification based on race. 1l9 The plu
rality announced strict scrutiny as the constitutionally correct analy
sis and found that the Board's plan fell short of this stringent test.1 20
The plurality noted that it had never held that general notions of
societal discrimination are, in themselves, sufficient to meet the
compelling government interest requirement.1 21 "Rather, ... some
showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved"
is the benchmark for having a proper remedial purpose. 122 "Socie
tal discrimination, without more is too amorphous . . . ."123 To
make the proper evidentiary showing, the fact finder must believe
"that the employer had a strong basis in the evidence for its conclu
sion that remedial action was necessary."124 A proponent must
demonstrate the existence of identified state discrimination re
flected by a significant statistical disparity between the racial com
position of the school teaching staff and qualified minorities in the
local labor pool, as well as anecdotal evidence. 125 The Court
stressed that in the absence of these findings, a court could uphold
remedies that are "ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless
in their ability to affect the future. "126 In that spirit, the Court re
Id.
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1204 (D. Mich. 1982).
116. Id. at 1202·03.
117. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 284.
118. Id. at 273.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 283-84.
121. Id. at 274.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 276.
124. Id. at 277 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 274-76.
126. Id. at 276.
114.

115.
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jected the Board's role model theory because it lacked a valid reme
dial purpose. 127 The idea that black students are better off with
black teachers was offensive to the Court because it represented a
pre-Brown mentality.128
In discussing the narrow tailoring prong, the plurality focused
primarily on the rights of non-minorities by considering the heavy
burden imposed on them by the preferential layoff provision. 129
Although some impact on the rights of the majority is tolerable, the
means chosen by the Jackson County School Board placed it out of
the realm of constitutionality because of the encumbrance of losing
of an existing job, and hence, losing seniority,13O The plan was not
narrowly tailored because race-neutral alternatives were not ade
quately considered, and the range of minorities included a non-spe
cific and overly broad collection of the nation's diverse races.l3l
Perhaps more intriguing than the plurality opinion is Justice
O'Connor's concurrence. This opinion, in many ways, foreshad
owed her majority opinion in Grutter,132 Although O'Connor an
nounced that the Court was applying strict scrutiny, she began her
analysis by stating that the distinction between a compelling and an
important governmental purpose may be negligible. 133 In addition,
O'Connor noted that the "remedial purpose need not be accompa
ni~d by contemporaneous findings," and that even a non-remedial
purpose might qualify as a compelling government interest. 134 Jus
tice O'Connor opined that "although its precise contours are uncer
tain, a state interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been
found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the context of higher edu
cation, to support the use of racial considerations to further that
interest."135 Therefore, at least in Wygant, O'Connor left open the
possibility that the racial diversity rationale announced in Grutter
might emerge in the public employment context.136 While Wygant
centered upon the compelling government interest component of
strict scrutiny in the employment context, the precise form of the
narrow tailoring prong still required outlining.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-83.
Id. at 283-84.
Id. at 284 n.13.
Id. at 284-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 286.
Id.
[d.
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United States v. Paradise

In United States v. Paradise, the Supreme Court specified a
number of balancing considerations to guide lower courts in deter
mining whether an affirmative action plan was narrowly tailored. 137
The question in Paradise was whether a district court-ordered re
quirement of a 50% promotion for black Alabama state troopers
was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.138 The suit began in 1972 with a federal district court
finding that the Alabama police department had systematically ex
cluded blacks from employment. 139 The district court determined
that in its thirty-seven year history, the patrol never had a black
trooper. 140 The district judge formed a plan to combat Alabama's
discrimination of African Americans. 141 The district court ordered
injunctive relief and instructed the Department to "hire one black
trooper for each white trooper hired until [qualified] blacks consti
tuted approximately 25% of the state trooper force."142 After more
than a decade of court supervision, the department never made
meaningful progress, and in 1983, a final court order provided that
for a limited period, "at least 50% of the promotions to corporal
must be awarded to black troopers, if qualified black candidates
were available."143 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's order. 144 It concluded that the relief at issue was a tempo
rary remedy intended to correct the egregious effects of past racial
discrimination. 145
The trouble in Paradise began with the Supreme Court, once
again, conjuring up a paltry plurality, led by Justice Brennan. 146
The Court therefore failed to reach a consensus on the appropriate
level of judicial scrutiny. The plurality held that the affirmative ac
tion plan survived strict scrutiny, so it was not necessary to reach a
majority consensus on the level of scrutiny.147 The plurality further
held that the Alabama plan was narrowly tailored to achieve a com
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

480 u.s. 149, 171 (1987).
Id. at 153.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 154-55.
Id.
Id. at 162, 163.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 165-66.
See id. at 153.
Id. at 166-67.
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pelling government interest.1 4s Paradise confirmed Wygant's cen
tral principle that the government "has a compelling interest in
remedying past and present discrimination by the state actor."149
Four decades of state exclusion of blacks from upper rank positions
unquestionably created a compelling state interest in remedying a
hiring process that was riddled with discrimination. 150
The Court announced a set of balancing considerations that are
still used by lower courts to ascertain whether an affirmative action
plan meets the narrow tailoring requirement. 15I Courts must look
to the following factors: (1) "the necessity for the relief"; (2) "the
efficacy of [race-neutral] alternative remedies"; (3) "the flexibility
and duration of the relief, including the availability of waiver provi
sions"; (4) "the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant
labor market [statistics]"; and (5) "the impact of the relief on" third
party rightS. 152
In applying the announced factors, the Paradise plurality found
that the 50% promotion quota was narrowly tailored. 153 First, the
plurality ascertained that the relief chosen was necessary to achieve
the objective sought due to Alabama's tumultuous racial past and
manifest disregard of the district court's order to correct past effects
of discrimination.1 54 Second, even race-neutral alternatives pro
posed by Alabama failed to correct expeditiously the effects of past
discrimination. 155 Third, the practical operation of the 50% promo
tion requirement was adequately "flexible, waivable, and tempo
rary."156 Such flexibility included a waiver of the racial preference
plan if no qualified black candidates were available. 157 Fourth, the
court-ordered plan would only last until the department came up
with a promotion procedure that discontinued official discrimina
tion against African Americans. 15S Flexibility was also demon
strated because the 50% requirement was simply a means to
achieve the goal of 25% representation. 159 Finally, the Court held
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 167.
at 170.
at 171.
at 185-86.
at
at
at
at
at

172.
178.
177.
178.
163-64.
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that the affirmative action plan "did not impose an unacceptable
burden on innocent third parties. "160 After all, the plan did not "re
quire the layoff and discharge of white employees. "161 Ultimately,
the announcement of the balancing test created a situation in which
no stringent rules would control the constitutionality of racial pref
erences in employment. Rather, the jurisprudence would develop
on a case-by-case basis. Any or all of these factors could be applied
fully, or in part, depending on the specific case on review. A mean
ingful amount of discretion was left with the judicial branch. How
ever, with discretion comes uncertainty.
As in Wygant, Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Para
dise demonstrated how a swing vote could affect the expansion of
Grutter into public employment. Justice O'Connor began by criti
cizing the majority's application of the strict scrutiny test, writing
that although "[t]he plurality today purports to apply strict scrutiny,
... the Court adopts a standardless view of 'narrowly tailored' far
less stringent than that required by strict scrutiny."162 Although
Justice O'Connor did not view the affirmative action plan as a rigid
quota, she acknowledged that more flexible goals might also "tram
mel unnecessarily" the rights of non-minorities and must be done
sparingly.163 One of Justice O'Connor's central concerns was that
the plan was not "truly designed to eradicate the past effects" of
discrimination. 164 More dramatically, the one-for-one promotion
quota "far exceeded the percentage of blacks in the trooper
force." 165 Hence, the statistical comparison between the percent
age of minority workers to be promoted and the percentage of mi
nority group members in the relevant work force was improperly
skewed. 166 Justice O'Connor felt that the promotion goal must
have a "closer relationship to the percentage of [minority group
members] eligible for promotions" in the local labor pool.1 67
Justice O'Connor next criticized the lack of good-faith consid
eration of race-neutral alternatives such as "appoint[ing] a trustee
to develop a promotion procedure that would satisfy the terms of
the consent decrees."168 In O'Connor's view, at the very least, strict
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 182.
at 196-97.
at 197.
at 198.
at 199.
at 200.
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scrutiny required "that the District Court expressly evaluate the
available alternative remedies."169
Ultimately, Justice O'Connor wrote that the affirmative action
plan failed the narrow tailoring prong because it imposed a racial
quota and did not adequately consider the efficacy of race-neutral
alternatives. 170 This dissenting opinion is particularly surprising
when compared with O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter, in
which she stood on the opposite side of the fence. l71 In Grutter,
Justice O'Connor applied the same form of watered down strict
scrutiny she condemned in Paradise. l72 A few years after Paradise,
in City of Richmond v. 1.A. Croson Co., the Supreme Court decided
in a 6-3 opinion that strict scrutiny analysis is the appropriate test
for courts to apply when examining state affirmative action pro
grams. 173 This consensus was, however, short-lived.

3.

City of Richmond v. 1.A. Croson Co.

In Croson, the Justices split along ideological lines in a barrage
of divergent opinions.174 Croson subtly returned to the pre-1989
debate over whether non-remedial interests can be compelling and
whether benign discrimination is constitutional.1 75 This case went
beyond technicalities and provided insight into the Court's division
over the constitutional value of racial preferences, an issue that re
mains contentious. 176
The Croson saga began in 1983 when the Richmond City
Council adopted the Minority Business Utilization Plan.177 This
plan, declared "remedial in nature," required prime contractors re
ceiving city contracts "to subcontract at least [30%] of the dollar
169. [d. at 201.
170. Id.
171. Compare United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149,201 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that although the plurality purports to apply "strict scrutiny," the
Court, in actuality, adopted a standardless review of the narrowly tailored component
of strict scrutiny, much less stringent than required by traditional form of review), with
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003), in which Justice O'Connor led the major
ity and accepted a much more relaxed application of strict scrutiny's narrow tailoring
prong by not requiring a sunset provision and minimizing the duty of the law school to
try race neutral admission alternatives.
172. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
173. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493-94 (1989).
174. . Id. at 511 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at
528 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
175. [d. at 476-77 (majority opinion).
176. [d. at 511 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at
528 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 477 (majority opinion).
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amount of these contracts to Minority Business Enter
prises"("MBEs")P8 An MBE is a business in which "at least
[51 %] ... is owned and controlled ... by minority group mem
bers."179 Minorities who qualified under the plan included "citizens
... who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos
or Aleuts. "180 A waiver would be granted only under exceptional
circumstances. 181 Proponents of the plan relied on statistics show
ing that while Richmond's general population was 50% black, only
0.67% of the city's construction contracts were awarded to minority
businesses from 1978 to 1983. 182 The controversy arose when Rich
mond compelled Croson, a general contractor, to offer a subcon
tract to a minority firm, which ended up raising the cost of the
project,183 The city denied Croson's request for a waiver, or in the
alternative, an overall increase in the contract price. l84 Croson then
filed suit against the City under § 1983.185 He contended that the
Richmond ordinance was unconstitutional both facially and as ap
plied to his case. 186
The central issue addressed was whether Richmond's 30% re
quirement for minority subcontractors violated the Equal Protec
tion Clause. 187 The Court, led by Justice O'Connor, began by
announcing strict scrutiny as the touchstone for constitutional re
view.1 88 The Court held that the city's plan failed the strict scrutiny
test because it was unable to show a compelling governmental inter
est.1 89 Justice O'Connor concluded that none of the city's findings
provided Richmond with a strong basis for its conclusion that reme
dial action was necessary; the 30% financial quota could not be re
alistically tied to an injury suffered by an individual citizen of
Richmond. 190 The generalized finding of societal discrimination
reached by comparing the number of blacks in the local community
to the number of black subcontractors awarded city contracts was
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 477-88.
at 478.

at 479-80.
at 482-83.
at 483.
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wholly improper.1 91 The proper statistical comparison is the ratio
of qualified black subcontractors in the local labor market to the
number of minority owned business that are awarded city
contracts. 192
In conducting the narrow tailoring analysis, Justice O'Connor
indicated that the program was flawed because the 30% quota was
a rigid target that was completely unrelated to a proper remedial
purpose and could only have served the unconstitutional goal of
"outright racial balancing."193 In addition, the plan was over-inclu
sive because it included obscure minority groups whose histories
were relatively unscathed by this Republic's racist past.1 94 Finally,
Richmond failed to discuss adequately, or even consider, viable
race-neutral alternatives to its race-based quota. 195 Such alterna
tives should have included "[s]implification of bidding procedures,
relaxation of bonding requirements, and training and financial aid
for disadvantaged entrepreneurs of all races."l96 Justice O'Connor
stressed the importance of the temporary nature of racial prefer
ences to ensure that deviation from equal treatment has meaningful
limits.1 97
Croson also provided insight into some of the Justices' core
ideologies. For example, Justice O'Connor felt that the Richmond
plan was unconstitutional because the determination was based
solely on race. 198 Therefore, it is reasonable to expect, as Grutter
illustrates, that O'Connor would uphold a plan where race is ac
companied by other factors. Justice O'Connor also highlighted the
importance of strict scrutiny as a means of discerning benign or re
medial classifications from those motivated by racial politics.1 99
Hence, in Justice O'Connor's view, it appears there is a difference
between discrimination aimed at the minority and discrimination
aimed at the majority to correct the discrimination directed at the
minority. Yet, in contrast to her concurrence in Wygant,2oo Justice
191. Id. at 501-02.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 507.
194. Id. at 506.
195. Id. at 507.
196. Id. at 509-10.
197. Id. at 510.
198. See id. at 493.
199. Id.
200. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 284-86 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (implying that even a non-remedial purpose such as racial diversity might
qualify as a compelling government interest).
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O'Connor articulated that "[ u ]nless [racial classifications] are
strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may [exacerbate] no
tions of racial inferiority and lead to ... racial hostility."201 There
fore, Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Croson seems to reject her
earlier argument that other non-remedial interests, such as racial
diversity, should qualify as compelling governmental interests
under the first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis. 202
Justice Stevens took a view similar to that of Justice O'Connor
in Wygant. 203 Although voting with the majority, Justice Stevens
wrote a separate concurrence to voice his opinion that the remedial
goal of correcting past or present discrimination should not be the
only governmental interest considered compelling. 204 In particular,
Justice Stevens implied that the government interest of racial diver
sity could very well withstand strict scrutiny.205
Justice Scalia's opinion provides an important description of
the color-neutral paradigm of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Jus
tice Scalia's view, discrimination, whether branded benign or invidi
ous, is contrary to the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. 206 The
official exercise of discriminatory racial classifications, whether di
rected at those whose skin is black or those whose skin is white, is
equally offensive to the Constitution. 207 Justice Scalia believes that
rights and benefits cannot be protected, advanced, or diminished on
the basis of race. 208 Attempting to even the score is self-defeating
in that it "reinforce[s] a manner of thinking ... that was the source
of the [racial] injustice" itself.209
Justice Marshall's opinion represents the progressive jurispru
dential view of the contemporary critical race theorists. 210 Accord
ing to Justice Marshall, strict scrutiny is inappropriate in some racial
classification contexts. 211 Justice Marshall would require that racial
201. Id.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 512-13 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the jUdgment).
204. Id. at 511.
205. Id. at 511-12
206. Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).
207. [d. at 527-28.
208. [d.
209. Id. at 527.
210. See Rachel F. Moran, People of Color, Women, and the Public Corporation:
Whatever Happened to Racism?, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 899, 906-12 (2005) (explaining
that Critical Race Theory challenges traditional biological understandings of race and
considers race a social construct that remains tainted by the legacy and institution of
both intentional and subtle racism).
211. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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preference plans be subject to intermediate scrutiny.212 Under this
more lenient standard, the affirmative action plan "must serve
[only] important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to [the] achievement of those objectives."213 On a broad
scale, Justice Marshall considered racial discrimination designed to
help minorities "by remedying the effects of discrimination" to be
benign and deserving of constitutional protection. 214 Therefore,
rights could more easily be protected on the basis of race if the
racial classification operated against the political majority and in
favor of the political minority.215

4.

Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission

Justice Marshall's minority position became a constitutional re
ality just one year later in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Com
munications Commission. 216 One significant difference between
Croson and Metro Broadcasting, however, is that Metro Broadcast
ing involved the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amend
ment's Due Process Clause rather than that of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 217 Leading the majority in Metro Broadcasting, Jus
tice Brennan announced a new concept of equality.
Metro Broadcasting dealt with the "minority preference poli
cies of the Federal Communications Commission."218 The principal
question was whether awarding a preference to minorities in the
bidding process for the Federal Communication Commission
("FCC") licenses contravened the Equal Protection component of
the Fifth Amendment. 219 The FCC defined minorities as "Black,
Hispanic Surnamed, American Eskimo, Aleut, American Indian,
and Asiatic American. "220 The origin of these racial preferences
began as an amendment to the Federal Communications Act of
1934.221 In response to the scarcity of minority groups holding
212. See id.
213. Id. (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 428 U.S. 265, 359 (1978».
214. See id. at 552-53.
215. See id.
216. Metro Broad. Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,566 (1990) (applying intermediate
scrutiny), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
217. Id. at 552.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 554 n.1 (citing Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broad
casting Facilities, 68 F.CC 2d 979, 980 n.8 (1978)).
221. See 47 U.S.C §§ 151, 301, 303, 307, 309 (1982). The amendment sought to
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broadcast licenses, the FCC authorized minority preferences as a
means of increasing broadcast viewpoints. 222 The FCC reasoned
that diversity of opinion in broadcasting better educates the non
minority audience. 223 Race was considered a plus factor among
other factors including "full-time participation in station operation
by owners, ... proposed program service, ... [and] efficient use of
frequency."224 Metro Broadcasting challenged the constitutionality
of this minority preference program when it lost a license to a mi
nority-controlled firm.225 The FCC Review Board overturned the
administrative law judge's decision, finding that despite Metro
Broadcasting's "local residence and civic participation advantage,"
the 90% Hispanic makeup of Rainbow Broadcasting, Metro Broad
casting's competitor for the license, warranted a substantial racial
preference in Rainbow Broadcasting's favor. 226 A divided Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the FCC's ruling.227
A majority of the Supreme Court agreed, applying a new level
of scrutiny to affirm the Appeals Court decision. 228 First, the Court
noted the significance of this case, which dealt with a benign minor
ity preference program specifically mandated by Congress. 229 Due
to explicit congressional direction, as opposed to state action, a
greater level of deference was required. 230 According to Justice
Brennan, the decision in Croson announced just one year earlier
was not applicable because it dealt with state action. 231 Instead, the
majority adopted the intermediate level of scrutiny to evaluate non
remedial racial classifications authorized by the federal govern
ment. 232 The FCC's racial preference plan would be upheld under
this model, so long as the initiative served an "important govern
mental objective[] and . . . [was] substantially related to the
achievement of that objective. 233 The Court held that the FCC plan
follow in the footsteps of the original purpose of the statute, which was to actively
enhance the cultural diversity of programming. Id.
222. Metro Broad. Inc., 497 U.S. at 555-56.
223. Id. at 556 (citing 68 F.C.C. 2d at 980-81).
224. Id. at 556-57.
225. Id. at 558-59.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 560.
228. Id. at 566.
229. Id. at 563.
230. Id. at 564-65.
231. Id. at 565.
232. Id. at 564-65.
233. Id.
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met the criteria and was constitutional.234 In applying the first
prong of intermediate scrutiny, the majority reasoned that broad
cast diversity qualified as an important government objective be
cause it "contribut[ed] to a 'robust exchange of ideas."'235 In turn,
a higher representation of minority broadcasters would benefit the
public at large by providing "access to a wider diversity of informa
tion services. "236
In conducting the substantial relationship analysis, the Court
accorded deference to the expertise of the FCC, as well as to con
gressional findings revealing that achieving the "nexus between mi
nority ownership and [broadcast] diversity" could only be achieved
through racial preferences. 237 The race-neutral alternatives exe
cuted by the commission in the decades before the affirmative ac
tion plan was implemented were found to be ineffective. 238 The
majority also articulated that the plan was temporary because it
would be subject to a series of congressional appropriations. 239 Fi
nally, the FCC's plan did not place an undue burden on third par
ties. In order to correct injustice, "innocent persons may be called
upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy."240
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Metro Broadcasting further illus
trates her inconsistent Equal Protection jurisprudence.241 While
echoing points from her Wygant dissent, the opinion provided an
ideology that stands at odds with her majority opinion in Grutter.
Justice O'Connor stated that strict scrutiny was the appropriate
level of review because the harm caused by the racial classification
was no less onerous if the action were taken by the federal govern
ment rather than the state. 242 A lower standard of review was sim
ply too dangerous in that "the Government [could] resort to racial
distinctions more readily."243 Justice O'Connor reasoned that the
FCC's plan was unconstitutional under strict scrutiny because it im
permissibly provided benefits to some and burdens to others "based
on the assumption that race . . . determines [socio-economic and
234.
235.
(1978».
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

243.

Id. at 566.
Id. at 568 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-13
[d.
[d. at 569.

Id.
Id.
[d.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at
at
at
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at

585.
594.
596.
602-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
604.
610.
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political perspective]."244 Justice O'Connor also stated that
"[m]odern Equal Protection [jurisprudence] has recognized only
one [compelling] interest: remedying the effects of racial discrimi
nation. "245 Broadcast diversity is "too amorphous ... and ... unre
lated to any legitimate basis for employing racial classifications" to
be characterized as a compelling state interest. 246 In fact, Justice
O'Connor wrote that racial classifications must be left only for re
medial settings, otherwise they would foster "notions of racial infer
iority and . . . hostility."247 The FCC scheme was, therefore,
nothing more than an attempt at racial balancing, even though race
was only one of many factors.248 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor
stated that attempting to create "viewpoint diversity by identifying
... a 'black viewpoint' [or] an 'Asian viewpoint'" would not even
pass a low-level rational basis test.249

5. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena
The final pillar of the remedial foundation of racial preferences
in public employment was placed in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena. 250 The Supreme Court authorized the use of strict scrutiny
for any racial preference program, whether the classification is com
mitted by the state or federal government and regardless of the race
of the program's beneficiaries. 251 Finally, a fundamental consensus
was reached concluding that racial preference plans must be viewed
with the utmost caution. Nevertheless, the freshly appointed Jus
tices Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg, together with the wavering Jus
tice O'Connor, left the practical application of strict scrutiny
resembling a sheep dressed in wolf's clothing.
The primary issue in Adarand was whether financial incentives
provided to general contractors to hire minority sub-contractors
contravened the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amend
ment. 252 The controversy began when Mountain Gravel & Con
struction Company, a general contractor, awarded a guardrail
subcontract to Gonzales Construction Company instead of
244. Id. at 602.
245. Id. at 612.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 613.
248. Id. at 614 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507
(1989)).
249. See id. at 612-15.
250. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
251. Id. at 226.
252. /d. at 204.
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Adarand Constructors, notwithstanding Adarand's lower bid. 253
The prime contract was governed by the Surface Transportation
and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 ("STURAA").254
The contract provided that if Mountain Gravel "hired subcontrac
tors certified as small businesses controlled by 'socially and eco
nomically disadvantaged individuals,''' it would receive 10% of the
final amount of the approved minority subcontract as additional
compensation.255 In addition, STURAA required that 10% of the
appropriated funds be expended with small businesses "owned and
controlled" by minority groups.256 When it lost the guardrail sub
contract to the minority subcontractor, Adarand filed suit in federal
court, "claiming that race-based presumptions involved in the use
of [preferential] subcontracting compensation . . . violate [d] [its]
right to equal protection. "257 The Supreme Court vacated the
Tenth Circuit's decision, which had affirmed the district court's
granting of summary judgment to the government. 258
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, began the Court's
analysis by significantly reducing any precedential dissimilarities
between Equal Protection obligations under the Fourteenth
Amendment and those under the Fifth Amendment.259 Both con
stitutional provisions are analyzed in "precisely the same" way be
cause both aim to provide uniformity and fair order and to prohibit
arbitrary governmental power. 260
The Court overruled the use of intermediate scrutiny for be
nign racial preference plans under the Fifth Amendment, which had
been upheld in Metro Broadcasting. 261 Therefore, "all racial classi
fications, imposed by [any] governmental actor, must be analyzed
by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny."262 Hence, "such classifi
cations are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored mea
253. Id. at 205.
254. Id. at 208; see Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat, 132 (1987).
255. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 205, 209. Under The Small Business
Act, such individuals are defined as those who have been subject to racial or ethnic
prejudice because of their identity within such a group without regard to their individ
ual qualities. Blacks, Hispanics, Asians and Native Americans are presumed to be such
individuals.Id. at 205 (citing 15 U.S.c. § 637(d)(2), (3) (1994».
256. Id. at 208 (quoting the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation As
sistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 145).
257. Id. at 210.
258. Id. at 210-12, 239.
259. Id. at 213-18.
260. See id. at 213-17.
261. Id. at 226-27.
262. Id. at 227.
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sures that further compelling governmental interests."263 The
majority dispelled the notion that benign discrimination is pre
sumed to be more constitutionally tolerable than any other form of
intentional racial discrimination. 264 All racial classifications were
now to be confronted with skepticism and treated consistently.265
According to Justice O'Connor, Metro Broadcasting was an anom
aly in the organic tradition of Equal Protection jurisprudence
"stretching back over fifty years," which frowned upon protecting
rights on the basis of innate characteristics. 266 Nevertheless, Justice
O'Connor "wish[ed] to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny [will
always be] 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."'267 Justice O'Connor
believed that the government will be qualified, in particular in
stances, to respond to "the lingering effects of racial discrimination
against minority groups. "268 The Court remanded the case to the
Tenth Circuit to apply the newly announced standards. 269
This decision remains significant because although it an
nounced that the appropriate level of review is strict scrutiny, the
application has been far from uniform, as demonstrated in Grutter.
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Metro Broadcasting leaves
open the possibility that strict scrutiny is malleable. Consequently,
Grutter's alternative application of strict scrutiny, which looked
more like rational basis, could in theory allow the diversity ratio
nale to seep into some areas of public employment.
B.

Summation

Equal Protection jurisprudence in public employment now re
quires the application of strict scrutiny review. The Supreme
Court's progress from Wygant to Adarand solidified a number of
vital principles. Ultimately, "all racial classifications imposed by
[any] governmental actor," whether deemed invidious or benign,
receive the most exacting form of constitutional review, embodied
in strict scrutiny.27°
To satisfy strict scrutiny, the governmental action must be justi
263. Id.
264. [d. at 226-27.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 231-32.
267. Id. at 237 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,519 (1980) (Marshall,
J., concurring».
268. [d.
269. Id.
270. /d. at 227.
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fied by a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to
achieve such interest. 271 Currently, the Supreme Court has only
found remedying the effects of past or present de jure discrimina
tion to qualify as a compelling state interest. 272 To satisfy the stan
dard of proof required for state sponsored remediation, there must
be a specific showing of prior or current intentional discrimina
tion.273 This showing can be made by pointing to significant statisti
cal disparities between the number of qualified minorities in the
local labor pool and the number of minorities actually hired or pro
moted. 274 Additionally, the showing may include anecdotal evi
dence. 275 There must be a strong basis in the evidence to reach the
conclusion that remedial action is necessary.276 If a court finds a
compelling government interest, it then engages in a balancing test
to ascertain whether the proposed plan is narrowly tailored. 277 The
factors for consideration include:
the necessity for relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies;
the flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability
of waiver provisions; the relationship of the numerical goals to
the relevant labor market; and the impact of the relief on the
rights of third parties.278
After Grutter was decided in June of 2003, the application of
the strict scrutiny remedial framework announced in the Croson!
Adarand line of cases grew uncertain. Would the remedial justifica
tion be accompanied or perhaps even replaced with the freshly
minted diversity rationale?
IV.

GRUTTER ON THE JOB: THE DIVERSITY LANDSCAPE IN
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

A.

Initial Reaction by the Supreme Court

Grutter v. Bollinger redefined Equal Protection jurisprudence.
For the first time, a clear majority of the Supreme Court applied
strict scrutiny and legitimized a new rationale that fractured the
271. Id. at 229.
272. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
273. Id. at 277.
274. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989).
275. Concrete Works of Colorado v. City and County of Denver, 321 F.3d 950,
958 (2003).
276. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277.
277. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).
278. Id. at 206.
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traditional remedial paradigm in the educational context. 279 The
concept of racial diversity, at least in the educational context, now
qualifies as a compelling state interest under the first prong of strict
scrutiny analysis. 280 Justice O'Connor's rationale in Grutter was
based on deference given to the University of Michigan's conclu
sion that diversity enriches learning outcomes and better prepares
students for the professional challenges ahead in an increasingly di
verse workforce. 281 In addition, the Grutter majority altered the
narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny analysis by imposing a
less stringent application of the Paradise balancing factors. 282 The
Court accepted the concept of a critical mass as a permissible alter
native to quotas. 283
The Court rejected the viable race-neutral alternative to lower
ing admissions standards, across the board, to allow a broader array
of students to gain acceptance. 284 Notably, the Court did not ap
pear overly concerned with the impact on non-minority students,
who are adversely affected by the racial preference plan. The
Court reasoned that because all pertinent elements of diversity are
taken into account, all applicants can illustrate their uniqueness to
the admissions committee. 285 Although the Court expected that the
program would not be necessary within 25 years, it upheld the plan
despite its lack of a waiver or sunset provision. 286 Therefore, the
affirmative action plan may continue indefinitely.287
Grutter was an important case and its impact is not limited to
diversity in education. Grutter's expansion into the realm of public
employment is contingent on three central inquiries. First, whether
the Supreme Court will apply the watered down form of contextual
strict scrutiny announced in Grutter to public employers, thereby
279. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,328 (2003).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 330.
282. See id. at 334-35 (stating that the admission must be flexible when consider
ing diversity).
283. Id. at 335-36. A "critical mass" is an unannounced close range of seats gen
erally intended for minorities, as opposed to an unconstitutional quota, which is an
announced fixed range of spots reserved explicitly for minorities. Id. According to Jus
tice O'Connor, "'some attention to numbers' ... does not transform a flexible admis
sions system into a rigid quota" that contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 336
(quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978)) (alteration in
original).
284. See id. at 337-38.
285. Id. at 341.
286. Id. at 342.
287. Id. at 343.
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giving public employers the unprecedented deference it gave the
University of Michigan. Second, whether the Court will break with
the traditional remedial paradigm and declare that racial diversity is
a compelling state interest in public employment. Finally, whether
the Court will apply the liberalized narrow tailoring analysis, which
less rigidly and more arbitrarily applies the Paradise balancing
factors.
An initial response to the first inquiry was provided by the Su
preme Court in 2003 when the Court denied certiorari from a Tenth
Circuit case. 288 Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City and
County of Denver addressed whether the City of Denver had shown
a strong basis in the evidence for remedying past discrimination in
the construction industry.289 In dissenting from the Court's denial
of certiorari, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, ar
gued that the Tenth Circuit improperly decided the case because it
failed to apply the traditional strict scrutiny analysis of the Croson!
Adarand line of cases. 290 In particular, "[c]oming on the heels of
... Grutter v. Bollinger," Scalia felt that the Court's decision to
deny certiorari "invite [d] speculation that [Croson] has effectively
been overruled."291
In finding that the City of Denver had a compelling interest in
remedying past discrimination in the local construction industry,
the Tenth Circuit upheld the city's annual goal that 10% of the total
dollars spent on construction contracts be spent with minority
owned businesses. 292 The evidence that the City of Denver
presented in support of its affirmative action ordinance included
records, which did not indicate discrimination per se, but rather
demonstrated findings of the city's noncompliance with affirmative
action requirements, its failure to facilitate minority participation,
288. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, Colo., 540 U.S.
1027 (2003) (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
289. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 321 F.3d 950
(10th Cir. 2003).
290. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc., 540 U.S. at 1027, 1029-30.
291. Id. at 1027.
292. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc., 321 F.3d at 992, 994. A minority business was
defined in the 1990 ordinance as at least 51 % owned by 1 or more members of the
following minority groups: Blacks, Hispanics, Asian Americans or American Indians.
[d. at 956. In addition, in order to qualify under the affirmative action program, the
daily operations of the business must have been controlled by at least one eligible mi
nority group. Id. Once the city certified the business, it would then qualify to receive
special consideration in being placed in the pool of minority companies that were guar
anteed to receive 10% of the total money spent by Denver on construction contracts.
[d.
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and practices that appeared to have a negative effect on minority
groups.293 In addition, statistical disparity studies showed underu
tilization of minority contractors and that minority businesses were
less than half as likely to own their own businesses as were whites
of comparable age and experience. 294 Finally, the City of Denver
introduced anecdotal evidence that included certain instances of ra
cial and gender epithets, as well as the testimony of a senior vice
president of a majority-owned construction firm who stated that,
based on personal experiences, minority firms were judged incom
petent by non-minority firms.295
Disagreeing with the Tenth Circuit's finding of a strong basis in
the evidence, Justice Scalia criticized the court's manifest disregard
of Croson's requirement that the government actually prove it is
remedying identified discrimination. 296 According to the Tenth Cir
cuit, Denver must only show that "an inference of past or present
discrimination could be drawn" from the evidence. 297 In addition,
the Tenth Circuit heightened the showing that the plaintiff must
make, shifting the burden of proof to the plaintiff" 'to rebut [Den
ver's] initial showing of the existence of a compelling state inter
est.' "298 Justice Scalia pointed out the material inconsistency with
Croson, under which racial preferences cannot be a means to rem
edy unproven discrimination. 299 Scalia argued that it is always the
government's burden to prove, by a strong basis in the evidence,
that it is remedying identified discrimination and that there is a
strong basis in the evidence to conclude that such action is
necessary.300
In evaluating the evidence introduced by the City of Denver,
Justice Scalia pointed out that Denver made the wrong statistical
comparison by "assum[ingJ that minority firms were on average as
qualified, willing, and able" to perform the contract. 30 ! Denver did
not utilize actual bidding data or adjust the raw data via a regres
293. Id. at 960-61.
294. Id. at 962-63, 964-65.
295. Id. at 969.
296. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc., 540 U.S. at 1027 (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
297. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc., 321 F.3d at 970.
298. Id. at 959 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1175
(10th Cir. 2000)).
299. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc., 540 U.S. at 1030 (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
300. Id. at 1031.
301. Id. (emphasis in original).
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sion analysis. 302 Justice Scalia also pointed to the unworkability of
"studies [showing] racial disparities in business formation rates and
access to capital."303 Such realities can be dealt with by race-neu
tral measures, including the rigorous enforcement of non-discrimi
nation laws. 304 The fact that Denver continued to use racial
preferences "for a generation" greatly troubled Justice Scalia. 305
Scalia's primary concern was that the strong-basis-in-the-evi
dence standard announced in Wygant was being replaced by the
good-faith reliance paradigm announced in Grutter. 306 The Su
preme Court's acceptance of the Tenth Circuit's inference test, the
weak showing of evidence, and the lack of a sunset provision after
Grutter supports this concern. As one judge has noted, "[s]trict
scrutiny is not what it once was. . .. [I]t has mellowed in recent
decades."307 If recent precedent is any guide, a state's interest is
compelling if the state says it is.

B.

Extension of the Diversity Rationale to the Workplace

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was the first of two
courts to apply Grutter's diversity rationale to a public employment
case. 30B In Petit v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit addressed
whether racial preferences, in the form of artificially increased test
scores of minorities applying for the rank of sergeant in the Chicago
Police Department, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 309
In the mid-1980s the Department issued an examination to
promote 458 officers to the sergeant rank. 310 Of the 3,416 officers
who took the examination, 2,274 were white, 931 were African
American and 192 were Hispanic. 311 The examination consisted of
a multiple-choice section, a written short answer component, an
oral component, and a practical performance evaluation. 312 After
302. [d. at 1031-32.
303. [d. at 1032.
304. Id. at 1033.
305. Id. at 1034.
306. Id.
307. Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 105 (Cal.
2004) (Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 816 (2004).
308. See Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
541 U.S. 1074 (2004).
309. [d. at 1112.
310. Id. at 1116.
311. [d.
312. [d.
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standardizing the results to eliminate differences in subjective grad
ing in the oral and short answer portion of the test, the results
showed that African Americans and Hispanics did not score well
enough to allow a substantial number of promotions from these ra
cial groups.313 Of the 458 promotions, the test results would have
yielded the promotion of only 60 African Americans and 15 His
panics. 314 To balance this inequality, the city upwardly adjusted the
results for African Americans and Hispanics to "reflect[ ] the score
a candidate would have received if the test had not had an adverse
racial impact. "315 Instead of 60 African Americans promoted to the
sergeant rank, 119 promotions were made, constituting 59 addi
tional promotions, an increase of 98.3%.316 Similarly, Hispanics re
ceived 41 promotions instead of 15, resulting in a 273.3%
increase. 317 White officers who were not promoted filed suit in fed
eral court. 318 The district court "granted summary judgment for the
city based on its claim that the police department had an opera
tional need to engage in affirmative action and that the action it
took was narrowly tailored."319
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit set the stage for its approach
when it stated that it must conduct the analysis in accordance with
the University of Michigan cases of 2003. 320 The court began by
quoting sections of Grutter, which held that racial diversity is a
compelling government interest. 321 Judge Evans, writing for the
three-judge panel, noted that Grutter's affirmation of the deference
given to the University of Michigan could also be applied to the
Chicago Police Department. 322
Taking Grutter's approach, the court ruled under the rubric of
operational need that "there is an even more compelling need for
diversity in a large metropolitan police force charged with protect
ing a racially ... divided ... city."323 The court adhered to Grutter's
unorthodox form of strict scrutiny by giving substantial deference
to the Chicago Police Department's expert witnesses in concluding
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at 1116-17.
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at
at
at
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"that affirmative action was warranted to enhance the operations of
the [Chicago Police Department.]"324 Criminal justice experts,
based on studies conducted since the 1960s, revealed "that minori
ties are frequently mistrustful of police and are more willing than
non-minorities to believe that the police engage in misconduct."325
In turn, "this lack of confidence ... reduce[s] the willingness of
some [minority] community members to cooperate with the po
lice."326 A former chief of police in Oregon noted, and several
high-ranking members of the Chicago Police Department agreed,
that diversity at the sergeant rank helps "to influence officers on
the street," to improve cooperation, and defuse dangerous situ a
tions. 327 The court also stated that the growth of minorities in the
community must be paralleled at the sergeant rank to earn the com
munity's trust and, ultimately, enhance the police department's
ability to prevent and solve crimes. 328 Hence, the city concluded,
and the Seventh Circuit accepted as a compelling interest, that a
diverse police force would better earn the community's trust and
better protect Chicago citizens. 329
The Seventh Circuit also found that upwardly adjusting minor
ity applicants' test scores was narrowly tailored to achieve the goal
of diversifying the police force. 33o In beginning its analysis, the
court echoed Grutter, which provided that mechanical, predeter
mined bonuses are unacceptable, yet race used as a plus factor in a
flexible, non-mechanical manner is constitutionally acceptable. 331
A sunset provision and consideration of the impact of the racial
preference on members of the majority were essential to the Sev
enth Circuit's formulation. 332 In applying the Paradise factors, the
court reasoned that the score adjustment used by the Chicago Po
lice Department met the second prong of strict scrutiny, because
the city was merely altering the test results to reflect "the score a
candidate would have received if the test had not had an adverse
racial impact."333 Additionally, because the test was not validated
and because the margin of error revealed that the lowest scoring
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at 1117-18.
at 1116.
at 1117.
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white candidate and the top scoring black candidate were very
close, the candidates were both qualified. 334 The Seventh Circuit
further noted that the program ceased after 1991 and the city ade
quately minimized the harm to the 82 plaintiffs in the action, 50 of
whom were denied promotion. 335 Finally, the Court distinguished
the twenty-point advantage struck down in the University of Michi
gan undergraduate case 336 and reasoned that the score adjustment
here could be seen "not as an arbitrary advantage given to the mi
nority officers, but rather as eliminating an advantage the white of
ficers had on the test. "337
The Seventh Circuit again applied the diversity rationale in the
context of public employment in a 2004 decision concerning promo
tional opportunities in a Fire Department. 338 Biondo v. City of Chi
cago explored a fact pattern nearly identical to that of Petit.339
White applicants for promotion were delayed pursuant to an af
firmative action program; the city defended the program as comply
ing with federal regulations. 34o Judge Williams, in a concurring
opinion, implied that the city should not only have pled a remedial
basis for its action, but it should have also pled the operational
need corollary to the diversity rationale approved in Petit just one
year earlier. 341 Judge Williams noted that a "non remedial reason
may also constitute a compelling interest supporting the use of race
and ethnicity in employment decisions."342
In Lomack v. City of Newark, a second court applied the diver
sity rationale in public employment. 343 Since 1980, Newark had
been under a consent decree designed to combat the intentional
racial discrimination that existed in its fire department. 344 The de
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
337. Petit, 352 F.3d at 1117-18; see Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (holding that while
racial diversity is a compelling government interest, a 20-point award to minority appli
cants in the selection process in the undergraduate division of the University of Michi
gan was not a narrowly tailored measure to achieve the sought after diversity).
338. Biondo v. City of Chicago, 382 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2004).
339. ld.
340. ld. at 683.
341. ld. at 692 (Williams, J., concurring). The Petit court stated that it was apply
ing the Grutter diversity model to the public employment area to address the opera
tional need of a large metropolitan police force. Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111,
1114 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1074 (2004).
342. Biondo, 382 F.3d at 692.
343. Lomack v. City of Newark, No. Civ.A.04-6085 (JWB), 2005 WL 2077479, at
*3 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2005).
344. ld. at *1.
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cree enjoined New Jersey from unlawfully discriminating against
black or Hispanic fire department employees or applicants with re
spect to hiring, assignment, training, discipline, promotion, or dis
charge. 345 In 1995, the city authorized two studies examining the
operation of the consent decree. 346 Based on these studies, the city
concluded that numerous firehouses were racially segregated. 347
For example, one study revealed that of the 108 teams of firefight
ers, 81 had a majority of white personnel, 15 were predominantly
black, 1 had a Hispanic majority, while the remaining 11 were inte
grated. 348 In 2002, the mayor ordered city officials to create a de
partmental personnel transfer system to create 100% diversity.349
In 2003, Newark announced its new plan of involuntary transfers of
firefighters across the city, on the basis of race, to diversify the de
partment and comply with the 1980 consent decree. 350 By 2004, the
city announced that all Newark fire teams had been racially inte
grated. 351 Soon after, white plaintiffs filed suit, claiming that the
involuntary transfers on the basis of race violated their constitu
tional rights under the Equal Protection Clause. 352
Surprisingly, the district court chose not to view this matter as
a reasonable remedial action by a city "operating under a Consent
Decree to desegregate its fire companies."353 Instead, the court ig
nored the remedial line of cases and analyzed the controversy as an
extension of Grutter v. Bollinger. 354 The court applied Grutter's
watered down strict scrutiny to Newark's desegregation policy and
found that the city had a compelling government interest in attain
ing a racially diverse fire company.355 The court found that expo
sure of firefighters to different backgrounds, vocabularies and
cultures better prepared them to work effectively with colleagues
and improve performance on tests for promotion. 356 In addition,
the court reasoned that although education is not the primary pur
pose of a fire company, firefighters spend substantial time in both
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Id.
Id
Id. at *2.
Id.
See id. at *3.
See id. at *2-3.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
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formal and informal training, and therefore, racial stereotypes can
be broken down in the firehouse just as in the classroom. 357 The
court applied Grutter's good-faith deference standard by taking the
testimony of both a former director and a chief at their word when
they stated that the camaraderie and tolerance gained by diversify
ing the fire company would improve the performance of the
firefighters. 358 Finally, after upholding Newark's plan as a constitu
tionally measured response, thereby passing the narrow tailoring
prong, the court went on to say that Newark's policy of augmenting
transfer requests was laudable as well as the "right and just" thing
to do. 359
Although the diversity model was extended by the Petit and
Lomack courts in the context of police and fire operations, courts
have taken the contrary approach in other fields of public employ
ment. 360 Perhaps the clearest expression against expanding the di
versity rationale to public employment was announced by a federal
district court in Florida in the context of public contracting. 361 In
Hershill Gill Consulting Engineers v. Miami-Dade County, engi
neering firms owned by white males challenged participation goals
ordered under the county's Minority and Women Business Enter
prise (MWBE) program. 362 Based on the Fourteenth Amend
ment's Equal Protection Clause, the plaintiffs argued that they were
unlawfully deprived of a fair chance to compete for county con
tracts because the MWBE program established participation goals
for granting architectural and engineering contracts to certain mi
nority contractors. 363 "In order to qualify [as a minority business
under] the MWBE program, a business must [have been] owned
and controlled by one or more Black, Hispanic or female individ
ual[], and [had to] have an actual place of business in Miami-Dade
County."364 African American-operated businesses would receive
12 % and Hispanic operated businesses would receive 25 % of all
architectural and engineering contracts. 365 To achieve these partici
pation goals, the county used several methods, including set-asides,
357.
358.
359.
360.

Supp. 2d
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *9.
See, e.g., Hershill Gill Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, 333 F.
1305 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
Id.
Id. at 1310.
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Id. at 1312.
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subcontractor goals, and bid preferences. 366 Bid preferences oper
ate by "artificially reduc[ing] a MWBE bid by as much as [10%] for
purposes of determining the lowest bid."367 Although the county
must revise and review the MWBE program annually, the participa
tion goals have remained unchanged since 1994, even after a study
revealed that racial parity was reached between 1996 and 1997.368
In 2000, the county hired an econometrician to analyze significant
statistical evidence in an effort to justify the MWBE program's con
tinued remedial purpose. 369 The district court withheld its order
until after Grutter v. Bollinger was decided and cases interpreting
Grutter were concluded. 370 Significantly, Miami-Dade "argue[d]
that its affirmative action program [was] in place to remedy past
and current discrimination in the architectural and engineering in
dustry."371 What the traditional remedial purpose had to do with
Grutter's diversity rationale is as unclear.
Beginning its analysis in a conventional fashion, the district
court announced that pursuant to A darand , "the applicable stan
dard for analyzing [the MWBE program was] strict scrutiny."372
Therefore, "the proponent of [the] racial classification bears the
burden of proving" a narrowly tailored compelling state interest
proven by a strong basis in the evidence. 373 Next, the court stated
that the Grutter diversity paradigm did not alter the remedial Equal
Protection framework. 374 The district court concluded that "Grutter
do[ es] not modify Croson or Adarand in the area of public con
tracting."375 Nevertheless, Judge Jordan felt that some of Grutter's
language was helpful in adjudicating the narrow tailoring prong of
the strict scrutiny analysis. 376
Consequently, after the court found that the county's remedial
justification was not compelling because it was supported by only
attenuated and weak evidence, the court engaged in the narrow tai
loring evaluation. 377 Judge Jordan echoed Grutter's caveat that
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1313-14.
Id. at 1315.
Id. at 1316.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1317.
Id.
Id.; see id. at 1326.
Id. at 1324-26.
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context matters when reviewing classifications for purposes of equal
protection inquiry.378 First, as applied to all the MWBE programs,
many of the minorities who took advantage of the racial prefer
ences were not actually minorities with respect to their numerical
composition in the local population. 379 Ultimately, the court struck
down the entire ambit of MWBE programs. 380
The district court then considered the legality of the Hispanic
Business Enterprise ("HBE") program. 381 The district court conse
quently ruled that the county failed to take into consideration any
race-neutral alternatives to the HBE program. 382 In striking down
the HBE program, the court found that the indefinite continuation
of a fixed numerical quota was inconsistent with Grutter's central
message. 383 In operation, courts seem willing to extend Grutter's
modified narrow tailoring prong to the traditional remedial model
in public employment cases. 384
C.

The Application of Grutter's Reformed Narrow Tailoring
Analysis

This subsection details cases in which lower federal courts have
relied on the traditional remedial justification set forth in the
CrosonlAdarand line of cases. In addition, it considers the manner
in which these courts have applied Grutter's deferential narrow tai
loring analysis.
In Bullen v. Chaffinich, two master corporals who were denied
promotions to the rank of sergeant argued that the Governor and
the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety used racial quotas
in hiring and promoting state troopers. 385 Both officers were eligi
ble for promotion between October 1, 2001 and December 31,
2001. 386 The test for promotion consisted of two parts: (1) a written
examination based on material in a textbook; and (2) an oral exami
nation. 387 Only those candidates who passed the written test were
378. [d. at 1326.
379. [d. at 1327.
380. [d. at 1344.
381. [d. at 1330-31.
382. [d.
383. [d. at 1332-33.
384. W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. State DOT, 407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005); Bul
len v. Chaffinch, No. Civ.A. 02-1315-JJF, 2003 WL 22953222 (D. Del. Dec. 5, 2003).
385. Bullen, 2003 WL 22953222, at *1.
386. [d.
387. [d.
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eligible to take the oral examination. 3B8 The written and oral
scores, based on evaluations provided by neutral out-of-state police
officials, were combined to determine the candidate's final score. 389
Next, scores were banded according to standard deviation statistical
analysis. 390 In 1991, the Human Resources Department changed
the banding method, facilitating higher scores. 391 For example, if
the original model had created an A band with a range of 96-100
and a B band of 91-95, the new method would have resulted in
bands beginning at 92.5 and 87.5, respectively.392 The Superinten
dent instituted promotions based on the new band scores. 393 The
candidates from the highest band were promoted before moving on
to lower bands. 394
The plaintiffs argued that, beginning in 1998, the Governor and
the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety had used racial
quotas in hiring and promoting troopers.395 The former Human
Resources Director testified that the Secretary had a standing order
to recruit a particular percentage of minority candidates. 396 At
trial, the plaintiffs presented an e-mail from the Governor to the
Superintendent. 397 The e-mail revealed that the Secretary had or
dered 30% of trooper recruits be African American. 398 Additional
evidence demonstrated that the Captain of the state police force
had advised the Superintendent, in writing, that "written references
should not be made to [the Secretary's] 'direction to hire a class of
30% African American.' "399 Also admitted into evidence were
several promotion sheets and internal memos. 4OO The promotion
sheets and internal memos described efforts to increase minority
representation and contained numerical calculations, broken down
by race. 401 These figures tended to show that altering the standard
deviation resulted in more African Americans being promoted. 402
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at *2.

at *2 nn.2-3.
at *2.
at *3.

at *4-5.
at *5.
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The jury also considered an Executive Order from the Gover
nor, issued in response to a Justice Department inquiry, which an
nounced a plan to increase the number of minorities in the state's
"workforce to reflect the diversity of the state's population."403 Ev
idence also showed that the Governor hired an outside consultant
who recommended placing a freeze on all promotions in order to
examine aspects of the hiring and promotional practices of the state
police. 404 The plaintiffs argued that this freeze unlawfully pre
vented their promotions because approximately five vacancies ex
isted. 405 A few months later, the state used a new list of promotions
and promoted a woman and an African American man. 406 The de
fendant argued that it legitimately delayed filling many of these va
cancies because of a pressing need to review the operational need
of the force and its desire to conduct an assessment of the disrup
tion from a new wave of promotions resulting from the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks.407 The jury found for the plaintiffs and
concluded that the defendants unlawfully discriminated against
them on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Specifi
cally, the jury found that the defendants maintained an illegal quota
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 408
Delaware filed a post-trial motion, arguing that the verdict was
unsupported by evidence. 409 The state claimed that no reasonable
juror could have found that the defendants maintained an illegal
quota in the late 1990s and the latter part of 2001. 410 Based on
Grutter's unorthodox narrow tailoring analysis, the district judge
granted the defendant's motion and overturned the jury verdict. 411
The judge articulated that the state police did not maintain "a pro
gram in which a certain fixed number or proportion of opportuni
ties [was] 'reserved exclusively for certain minority groups."'412
The judge further disregarded the evidence of the e-mail imple
menting the 30% goal and ruled that even though "race was a sub
stantial and motivating factor," and "attempts were made by
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5-6.
See Bullen v. Chaffinch 336 F.Supp. 2d 342, 347 (D. Del. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 348.
Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335 (2003)).
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Defendants to manipulate the promotional process" to achieve mi
nority representation, an illegal quota did not exist. 413 Finally, the
judge stated, in dicta, that such generalized aggressive efforts to
achieve equal opportunity were admirable. 414
A 2005 decision from the Ninth Circuit addressed a similar is
sue. In Western States Paving Co. v. Washington State Department
of Transportation, the court considered whether the Transportation
Equity Act for the 21st Century's (TEA-21) authorization of racial
preferences in federally funded contracts violated the Equal Protec
tion Clause. 415 The plaintiff, a subcontractor, submitted bids for
two local paving projects. 416 The prime contractor was bound by
TEA-21's minority utilization requirement mandating 14% minor
ity participation. 417 Therefore, despite Western Paving's substan
tially lower bids, the general contractor awarded the subcontracts to
minority-owned firms.418
Congress passed TEA-21 based on evidence of past discrimina
tion in the transportation contracting industry.419 Enacted in 1998,
TEA-21 provided race and sex-based contracting preferences. 42o
The statute provided that, except as the Secretary of Transportation
otherwise determined, "not less than 10 percent of the amounts
made available ... shall be expended with small business concerns
owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals."421 The corresponding regulations identified blacks,
Hispanics, Asian Americans, Native Americans and women as so
cially and economically disadvantaged. 422 However, a safety net
provided that wealthy minorities could be disqualified while poor
non-minority contractors could be included in the program. 423 The
regulations explained that the 10% minority utilization requirement
was "aspirational in nature"; it could be tweaked by each individual
state and should only be used after attempting race-neutral alterna
tives. 424 The regulations also provided a two-step process for apply
413.
414.

Id.
Id.
415. W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. State DOT, 407 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2005).
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 988.
420. Id.
421. Id. (quoting the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No.
105-178, § 1101(b)(1), 112 Stat. 107, 113 (1998».
422. Id. at 988-89.
423. Id. at 989.
424. Id. at 989-90.
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ing race-conscious measures. 425 After calculating the relative
availability of minority firms in the local industry, the figure was
adjusted to reflect their proven capacity to perform the requisite
work.426
The court applied the traditional CrosonlAdarand remedial
framework, stating that racial "'classifications are constitutional
only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests.' "427 Unlike the Tenth Circuit's good-faith
burden-shifting paradigm of Concrete Works of Coiorado,428 the
Ninth Circuit stated that it must determine whether the United
States has shown by a "strong basis in the evidence" that TEA-21
satisfies strict scrutiny's exacting requirement that "remedial action
was necessary. "429
In analyzing the facial challenge, the court found that the fed
eral government had shown it had a strong basis in the evidence
that discrimination in the transportation industry warranted reme
dial action.430 The Ninth Circuit applied Grutter's modified narrow
tailoring analysis after quoting the Paradise factors. 431 First, the
court noted that TEA-21 did not establish an unconstitutional
quota because it only required a good-faith compliance effort.432
The Ninth Circuit ruled that unlike the 30% set-aside created in
Croson, the aspirational contracting goal of 10% provides the state
with a flexible system that adequately comports with narrow tailor
ing mandates. 433 Ultimately, the court reasoned that each state
could set "minority utilization goal[s] that reflect[ ed] the realities of
[the state's] own labor market."434 Next, the court cited Grutter's
requirement that while each conceivable race-neutral alternative
need not be exhausted, a good-faith consideration of race-neutral
alternatives must be implemented.435 Due to TEA-21's preference
that race-neutral measures be considered, the court found this fac
tor was met despite the lack of actual implementation of race-neu
425.
426.
427.
(1995».
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.

Id. at 989.
Id.
Id. at 990 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227
Concrete Works v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994).
See W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 991-92.
Id. at 991.
See id. at 993.
Id. at 994.
Id.
Id. at 995.
Id. at 993.
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tral measures. 436 Finally, the court decided that the burden placed
on white contractors who lost projects to minority contractors who
submitted higher bids did not itself invalidate TEA-21's racial pref
erence program. 437 The court reasoned that otherwise, all affirma
tive action plans would be unconstitutiona1. 438 As the decisions
from the Delaware district court and the Ninth Circuit illustrate,
federal courts are willing to extend Grutter's liberalized narrow tai
loring analysis to racial-preference cases in the employment arena.

v.

THE FUTURE OF THE DIVERSITY RATIONALE AND
CONTEXTUAL STRICT SCRUTINY IN
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

A.

Reading The Tea Leaves: Predictions and Analysis

The remedial framework laid out in the Croson!Adarand line
of cases is likely to stay in control of the public contracting sector,
as none of Grutter's foundational reasoning logically applies to gov
ernment contracting, including public works and defense con
tracting.
A three-tiered analysis facilitates the inquiry into
Grutter's potential outgrowth to public employment. The first tier
looks at important emanations from the remedial line of affirmative
action cases, ranging from Wygant in 1986 to Adarand in 1995. The
second tier examines the textual indicators from the Grutter major
ity. The third tier evaluates the lower federal courts' interpretation
of Grutter's diversity rationale in public employment cases.
1.

Remedial Line of Affirmative Action Cases

On balance, the Croson!Adarand line of cases does not
strongly indicate that the Grutter diversity justification will expand
to public employment. First, the remedial line of cases has estab
lished traditional strict scrutiny as the proper standard of review of
governmental racial classifications in all contexts. 439 More impor
tant, the only compelling government interest that a majority of the
High Court has agreed upon is remedying the effects of past or pre
sent de jure discrimination. 440 The Justice whose opinions provide
the clearest insight into how the Supreme Court might address the
436.
437.
438.
439.

See id. at 993-94.
Id. at 995.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 271.

440. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986); see Hiller v.
County of Suffolk, 977 F. Supp. 202, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
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diversity argument in employment cases has recently retired. In her
Wygant concurrence, Justice O'Connor suggested that a non-reme
dial paradigm encouraging racial diversity could emerge in public
employment. 441 Yet, in her Metro Broadcasting dissent, Justice
O'Connor rejected the notion that creating racial diversity in public
broadcasting was a compelling government interest, and articulated
that modern Equal Protection jurisprudence has recognized only
the remedial model as satisfying the initial prong of strict scru
tiny.442 Not only did Justice O'Connor waffle on the possibility of a
non-remedial justification, she also fluctuated on the strictness with
which strict scrutiny review would be applied. 443 Importantly, it
was her swing vote that decided both Adarand in 1995 and Grutter
in 2003. Without Justice O'Connor on the bench, it is hard to pre
dict what value the remedial line of cases will have on future
jurisprudence.
While the block of the four more liberal Justices on the Court
seem likely to accept the concept of creating diversity at the work
place as compelling, only Justice Stevens has stated his beliefs on
paper. 444 Concurring in Croson, Justice Stevens wrote that cor
recting the effects of past discrimination should not be the only
compelling government interest and hinted that creating racial di
versity could be an effective governmental purpose. 44S Despite the
uncertainty left by Justice O'Connor's departure, the remedial line
of cases is, at the very least, neutral; at most, it fails to indicate that
Grutter's diversity rationale will expand into public employment
cases. Grutter's textual emanations are, however, more indicative.
2.

Textual Emanations

The Grutter opinion begins by articulating the good-faith com
pelling state interest analysis, providing the caveat that not every
decision based on race is equally objectionable and that context
matters when reviewing such c1assifications.446 Grutter establishes a
441. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra text accompa
nying notes 133-37.
442. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990), overruled by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); see supra text accompanying notes 242
50.
443. See supra text accompanying notes 242-50.
444. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 US 469, 512-13 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see supra text accompanying notes
204-06.
445. See supra text accompanying notes 204-06.
446. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003).
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case-by-case approach in which the court might consider racial pref
erences in public employment. The Court further stated that reme
dying past discrimination is not the "only governmental use of race
that can survive strict scrutiny."447 This statement presents another
rationale that would, at least in principle, allow consideration of di
versity at the public workplace.
The Court provided two stronger signals that indicate the po
tential for expansion. First, the majority noted that the "[e]ffective
participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic
life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible,
is to be realized."448 Although this was dicta, the question that re
mains is whether the statement is merely an ethical aspiration or
whether it propounds a future constitutional mandate. Second, Jus
tice O'Connor noted that a diverse workforce benefits major Amer
ican businesses, many of whom have indicated that the skills
needed in today's global economy can only be developed through
exposure to diverse peoples and viewpoints. 449 Justice O'Connor
even pointed to the U.S. Armed Forces as an example of the neces
sity and effect of racial diversity.450
However, the textual indicators against expansion of the diver
sity rationale are more telling. The unprecedented good-faith ap
plication of strict scrutiny coupled with the non-remedial diversity
model in Grutter was based on the uniqueness of the educational
judgment of academic institutions. 451 Therefore, a crucial part of
the Court's holding was "in keeping with our tradition of giving a
degree of deference to a university's academic decisions, within
constitutionally prescribed limits. "452 It was through this educa
tional courtesy that the Court departed from the traditional reme
dial justification and ruled that racial diversity is a compelling
government interest. 453 Another important textual indicator
against expansion is that the diversity rationale is primarily based
upon "break[ing] down racial stereotypes" and making classroom
discussions "more spirited."454
In contrast, the government as an employer, whose purpose is
447.
448.
449.
450.
45l.
452.
453.
454.

Id. at 328.
Id. at 332.
Id. at 330-3l.
Id. at 33l.
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Id. at 330.
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to provide the efficient operation of essential services, functions in
a manifestly different capacity than the government as an educator.
It is attenuated to argue that breaking down stereotypes through
the process of intentionally giving preferences to minorities so that
they may bring a new perspective into the world debate improves
the durability of the pavement in a road, the accuracy of a missile
defense system, or the effectiveness of a fire department. Inten
tionally discriminating against individuals on the basis of race, in
the name of diversity, is not justified when the tasks at hand are
tangible and not pedagogical. Ultimately, Grutter's reasoning does
not logically extend to realizing the benefits of learning about dif
ferent races and livening discussion in the employment context.
The Court noted that the admissions policy at the University of
Michigan was implemented to prepare students for work and that
the "path to leadership [must] be visibly open to talented and quali
fied individuals of [all races]."455 A reasoned inference from these
particular statements is that while the High Court was tolerant of
racial preferences in the university context, it may be less enthusias
tic in the employment field. While affirmative action serves an ini
tial purpose of leveling the playing field at the formative level, the
Court implies that once the basic path is laid, the Court will be less
tolerant in the employment context where the goals and obligations
are fundamentally different. Even though the text and purpose of
Grutter point against expansion of the pure diversity justification,
the lower federal courts have taken it upon themselves to chart a
slightly different path. 456
3.

Interpretation by the Federal Courts

While a limited number of courts have actually applied the di
versity justification, others have employed a less rigorous narrow
tailoring analysis in the public employment context. Only two
courts, so far, have expressly applied Grutter's diversity model to an
employment case. The first case was Petit, which involved the oper
ational needs of the Chicago Police Force. 457 Some commentators
point to Petit as an important indication of the lower courts' willing
ness to extend Grutter's diversity justification.458 Nevertheless,
455. Id. at 331-32.
456. See, e.g., Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 541 U.S. 1074 (2004); Lomack v. City of Newark, No. Civ.A.04-6085, 2005 WL
2077479, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2005).
457. See supra text accompanying notes 310-39.
458. See Eric A. Tilles, Lessons from Bakke: The Effect of Grutter on Affirmative
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once Petit's surface is scratched, the reality beneath speaks not of
diversity but of public safety. By pairing African American author
ities with African American neighborhoods and Hispanic authori
ties with Hispanic neighborhoods, Petit did not address diversity,
but homogeneity. Petit, therefore, is not a logical extension of
Grutter's diversity paradigm. Instead, Petit applied an operational
need corollary to the diversity rationale; such a justification should
simply be called the public safety exception.
Grutter's holding, that diversity is a compelling government in
terest, was specifically based on the notion that diversity "helps to
break down racial stereotypes," facilitates understanding of differ
ent races, enlightens, creates more spirited dialogue, and better
prepares students as professionals. 459 In contrast, Petit's holding
and accompanying rationale were more about division than diver
sity. The Seventh Circuit, in essence, sees a compelling state inter
est in sending African American authorities into African American
neighborhoods and Hispanic authorities into Hispanic neighbor
hoods because African Americans better relate to African Ameri
cans and Hispanics better relate to Hispanics. 460 This arrangement
better diffuses criminal encounters between minorities and police
and prevents future crimes. 461
Ironically, the Chicago police force approach appears to follow
Professor Derrick Bell's interest-convergence thesis. 462 Bell's thesis
states that American law was founded on white, Eurocentric under
standing and power,463 and that minority progress occurs only when
advancing the interests of minorities is in the best interest of the
majority.464 If the operational need to diversify the sergeant rank
claimed by the Chicago police force affirms the notion that only
officials and citizens of the same race can best relate to one another
to control public safety, then the operational-need justification is
wholly antithetical to Grutter's diversity rationale. If Chicago
wanted to employ the pure diversity rationale, as described in GrutAction in Employment, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 451, 460 (2004); Michael L. Fore
man, Kristin M. Dadey & Audrey J. Wiggins, The Continuing Relevance of Race-Con
scious Remedies and Programs in Integrating the Nation's Workforce, 22 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 81, 103-04 (2004).
459. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
460. See supra text accompanying notes 325-29.
461. Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541
U.S. 1074 (2004).
462. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 47 (5th ed. 2004).
463. Id.
464. Id.
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ter, it would have implemented a plan to integrate the different
races of police sergeants and officers so the officers from repre
sented races would learn about the socio-economic heritage of
other officers to promote better cooperation within the local com
munity. White officers would learn from minority officers to enable
white officers to stand alone in a minority neighborhood, and vice
versa.
Incidentally, Newark, New Jersey did apply the integration ap
proach in Lomack v. City of Newark. 465 Nevertheless, Lomack's
application of the diversity rationale was seriously flawed. First, the
court expressly refused to see Lomack for the desegregation case
that it plainly was. 466 While the court noted that the involuntary
transfer plan was designed to effectuate the remedial purpose of the
consent decree, it applied Grutter's non-remedial diversity ratio
nale. 467 The diversity justification is not remedial in any sense.
Hence, the court in Lomack erred by confusing these two distinct
constitutional frameworks. The city should have prevailed under
the desegregation line of cases, modeled after the busing cases of
the 1960s, or in the alternative, the court should have applied the
CrosonlAdarand jurisprudence, which is grounded in the employ
ment context. Under the CrosonlAdarand line of jurisprudence,
transfers would be legitimate if they were undertaken to effectuate
the remedial purpose of the consent decree. 468 Instead, the district
court forced the education-based diversity rationale into an em
ployment context where it did not apply.
Despite Petit and Lomack, the distinct functions served by ed
ucation and employment indicate that an expansion of the diversity
rationale is unlikely, especially on higher levels of review. Inten
tionally hiring sergeants of a certain race to facilitate minority coop
eration with police, or laying pipe under an interstate highway, have
nothing to do with improving learning through diversity. The dis
trict court in Hershill Gill agreed. 469 In that case, when participa
tion goals were set for minority firms in the context of construction
465. Lomack v. City of Newark, No. Civ.A.04-6085, 2005 WL 2077479, at *3
(D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2005) (holding that achieving racial diversity within the Newark, N.J.
Fire Department is a compelling government interest because exposure of firefighters
to different backgrounds and vocabularies better prepares firefighters to work effec
tively with colleagues and improve performance on promotional exams).
466. Id. at *4.
467. Id. at *6.
468. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 476 (1989); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995).
469. See supra text accompanying notes 362-86.
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projects, the court stated that the Grutter diversity model did "not
modify Croson or Adarand in the area of public contracting. "470 At
least in the view of this particular court, the diversity rationale did
not apply to public contracting cases and, therefore, remedial cases
are unaffected by Grutter. 471
However, the diversity rationale could conceivably be applica
ble in the context of university professorships.472 A logical link be
tween Grutter's diversity reasoning and enhancing learning
outcomes through exposure to people of different races applies to
professors' interactions with students, and to the level of discourse
among students. 473 Classroom discussion is livened by diversity of
professors, thereby increasing the number of cultural views por
trayed to students. 474 Public school systems may also argue that
racial diversity is as important in elementary and secondary schools
as it is in Universities because it better prepares students for higher
education.
Overall, lower courts have readily extended Grutter's liberal
ized narrow tailoring analysis to the traditional remedial line of
cases. This approach includes acceptance of the critical mass or
unannounced range model, as accepted in Bullen and Western States
Paving. Other examples include a less exhaustive consideration of
race-neutral alternatives, tolerating a larger threshold of an accept
able burden on the majority, and possibly the lack of a sunset provi
sion. In addition, it is plausible that courts could continue in the
footsteps of the Tenth and Seventh Circuits and water down the
strict scrutiny analysis by giving substantial deference to the gov
ernment's position that affirmative action serves a compelling gov
ernment interest in certain circumstances. Perhaps some courts will
extend the diversity rationale to employment cases in an effort to
uphold suspect racial preference plans.
In Petit, the Seventh Circuit kept in line with Grutter's good
faith standard when it gave deference to the views of Chicago po
lice experts who concluded that racial preferencing used to enhance
diversity of the force was essential to carrying out operations. 475
470. Hershill Gill Consulting Eng'rs v. Miami-Dade County, 333 F. Supp. 2d
1305,1317 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
471. Id.
472. Suzanne E. Eckes, Diversity in Higher Education: The Consideration of Race
in Hiring University Faculty, 2005 BYU Eouc. & L.J. 33, 48 (2005).
473. Id.
474. Id. at 49.
475. Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111,1114-15 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
541 U.S. 1074 (2004).
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This action is directly analogous to the Supreme Court's approach
in Grutter. There, the Court used strict scrutiny as the appropriate
level of review, but took the University of Michigan at its word that
creating racial diversity was a compelling interest put in place to
improve learning outcomes and break down stereotypes. 476 In ad
dition, the three Supreme Court Justices who dissented from denial
of certiorari in Concrete Works of Colorado v. Denver questioned
the Tenth Circuit's approach to the remedial diversity justifica
tion. 477 The Tenth Circuit merely required that Denver demon
strate that an inference of discrimination could be drawn from the
evidence, as opposed to Wygant's more stringent requirement that
the government show a "strong basis in evidence."478
With a material change in the composition of the Supreme
Court, however, the Grutter decision itself, and perhaps all affirma
tive action programs in the United States, are just one vote away
from being stricken from American constitutional jurisprudence. If
Chief Justice Roberts mirrors former Chief Justice Rehnquist's vote
and Justice Alito becomes the swing vote, the Court would have the
5-4 majority required to overturn Grutter. A narrow interpretation
of "compelling government interest" in education cases would
make it extremely difficult to advance or protect constitutional lib
erties on account of race. Benign discrimination, and the concept
that the moral appropriateness of intentional discrimination
changes by altering the color of the beneficiary, would end.
Nevertheless, the probable short-term outcome is more re
strained. The Court will likely employ a case-by-case approach,
where stare decisis is well respected and fundamental changes in
the law occur more incrementally. In the near future, Grutter will
remain fundamentally intact or perhaps slightly modified. Yet even
under Grutter, the non-remedial diversity rationale is only mini
mally susceptible to expansion into public employment. It is likely
that the Supreme Court will be hesitant to apply the diversity ratio
nale to most public employment contexts.

B.

The Supreme Court and Judicial Politics

With Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito confirmed, affirm
ative action stands to be limited or perhaps functionally eradicated.
Based on the new Justices' jurisprudential temperament, it is un
476. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
477. 540 U.S. 1027, 1029 (2003).
478. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,277-78 (1986).
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likely that they will support the non-remedial racial diversity para
digm announced in Grutter. It is therefore conceivable that Chief
Justice Roberts, along with Justice Alito, could return the razor
sharp teeth back to strict scrutiny review. As a result, it is unlikely
that Grutter will extend into public employment.
A snapshot of Roberts's approach to Equal Protection issues is
revealed in an amicus brief he wrote in support of The Associated
General Contractors of America for Adarand Constructors v.
Mineta. 479 The 2001 Supreme Court case analyzed the constitution
ality of the TEA-21 statute that provided for racial preferences in
federal contracting projects. 480 In his brief, Roberts took a hard
line approach to Wygant's strong-basis-in-the-evidence requirement
and argued that Congress lacked the specific findings to support the
compelling interest behind the asserted remedial purpose of the
statute. 481 Roberts also highlighted that simple legislative pro
nouncements of good faith that lack specific findings regarding the
industry to which the preference is applied, cannot suffice. 482
Roberts's testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
however, revealed a more measured view of affirmative action. 483
For example, Roberts stated that he understood the current Court
to permit "[c]onsideration of race or ethnic background, so long as
it's not ... a make-or-break test."484 Roberts also expressed his
view that the Supreme Court adequately considered the impact of
affirmative action when it upheld the race-conscious admissions
program at the University of Michigan Law Schoo1. 485 In an ex
change with Senator Diane Feinstein, Roberts articulated that "ef
forts to ensure the full participation in all aspects of our society by
people, without regard to their race, ethnicity, gender, religious be
liefs, all of those are efforts that I think are appropriate."486 Fi
479. Brief for The Associated General Contractors of America as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Adarand Constructors v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001) (No. 00
730).
480. Adarand Constructors v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 105-06 (2001).
481. Brief for The Associated General Contractors of America, supra note 479, at
7-13.

482. Id. at 9.
483. Greg Stohr & Robert Schmidt, Roberts Gives Hints on Property, Race, Death
Penalty (Update 3), Sept. 14,2005, http://www.bloomberg.comJapps/news?pid=10000l03
&sid=AGjJjznR_R6Y&refer= US.
484. TopNews.com, Text of John Roberts Hearing 5, Sept. 14, 2005, http://www.
wtopnews.comJindex.php?nid=343&sid=570126.
485. Id.
486. SFGate.com, Text of John Roberts Hearing-19, Sept. 14, 2005, http://sfgate.
comJcgi-biniarticle.cgi?f=lN/al2005/09/13/nationaUw194051D18.DTL.
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nally, Roberts noted that "a measured effort that can withstand
scrutiny is ... a very positive approach."487
Justice Alito's position on affirmative action is more evident.
On his application to work under Attorney General Meese during
the Reagan Administration, Alito wrote, "I am particularly proud
of my contribution in recent cases in which the government has ar
gued in the Supreme Court that racial and ethnic quotas should not
be allowed and that the Constitution does not protect a right to an
abortion. "488 Alito noted that he believes" 'very strongly in limited
government, federalism, free enterprise, the supremacy of the
elected branches of government ... and the legitimacy of a govern
ment role in protecting traditional values."'489
Although Alito has not written an opinion on affirmative ac
tion in the Fourteenth Amendment context, he voted to strike
down an affirmative action program under Title VII, while the
Third Circuit was sitting en banc in 1996.490 In Taxman v. Board of
Education of the Township of Piscataway, the Board, faced with a
budget crisis, fired Ms. Taxman, a white teacher with equal seniority
to a black teacher, to achieve racial diversity on the faculty pursu
ant to an affirmative action program. 491 The en banc majority,
joined by Judge Alito, held that under Title VII, affirmative action
plans must have a remedial purpose to be upheld. 492 Thus, Judge
Alito signed on to the notion that, given the clear language of Title
VII, "a non-remedial affirmative action plan, even one with a laud
able purpose, cannot pass muster."493 In light of the new Justices'
conservative approach to affirmative action, it appears unlikely that
they will support an extension of the non-remedial diversity ratio
nale to public employment.
CONCLUSION

It is proper to ask" '[w]hether America's public policy effec
487. Id.
488. Bill Sammon, Alito Rejected Abortion as a Right, THE WASH. TIMES, Nov.
14, 2005, at A01.
489. Id. (quoting Samuel Alito's application for appointment as Deputy Assistant
Attorney General).
490. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1550 (3d Cir. 1996) (en
banc).
491. Id. at 1550-52.
492. Id. at 1557.
493. Id. at 1550.
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tively fights historical discrimination by practicing it."'494 The di
versity regime has placed the nation in a "paradox which is that we
are trying to eradicate the historically invidious effects of race [dis
crimination] with a process that institutionalizes race as the basis
for college admissions [and] faculty hiring [decisions]."495 Courts
should find that diversity is not a compelling government interest
under the Equal Protection Clause because it perpetuates affirma
tive entitlements. Above all, the negative liberties embodied within
the individual protections of the Constitution should be shields to
be used for defense rather than swords designed for attack.
The central issue is the relationship between negative liberty
and affirmative rights. The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment were added to our Constitution to ensure that the
state would not engage in the arbitrary exercise of power, a corner
stone of the oppression experienced under the English Crown.496
The negative liberties enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment are
in place to ensure the survival of the fundamental values of fair
order learned from both Lockean enlightenment philosophy and
the Republic's ongoing journey in order to prevent the abuse of
power. The Fourteenth Amendment should protect citizens from
official oppression, but the Amendment should not provide a cate
gorical right to privileged entitlements based on race, when the citi
zen has suffered no de jure discrimination. Hence, the only
justification that arguably fits within the text and purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the remedial model recognized in the
CrosoniAdarand line of cases. Under the remedial model, a reme
dial program is constitutional where there is proof that discrimina
tion committed by the state caused the harm that will be
remedied. 497 Above all, it is imperative to recognize that the mo
rality of intentional racial discrimination does not change by revers
ing the colors of the perpetrator or beneficiary. The same wrong
drives both discrimination and its remedy.
In the employment context, diversity proponents would try to
supplement Grutter's reasoning with the justification of a represen
tative bureaucracy. In the literal sense, a representative bureau
cracy is "a civil service in which every race, caste, or social class of
persons in a nation are represented in exact or roughly proportional
494.
Action be
495.
496.
497.

Dinesh D'Souza, Affirmative Action Debate: Should Race Based Affirmative
Abandoned as a National Policy?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 425, 429 (1996).
Id.
EpSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 23, at 630-31.
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986).
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numbers to its makeup in the overall population."498 This approach
values the social equity achieved through racial diversity above the
standards of efficiency and individual rights. In short, the represen
tative bureaucracy is designed to generate a workforce that is
broadly characteristic of the society in which it functions, so people
of authority can better relate and, hence, service the corresponding
racial segments of the citizenry.499 Yet, proponents fail to consider
efficiency. The government should demand the best possible em
ployees, for the best possible team in order to achieve efficient op
erations in its conceived purpose of servicing the citizenry. Several
reviews have found that there is no clear economic case for
diversity.50o
Supporters of affirmative action and diversity reason that ra
cism is omnipresent in American society.50l A recent article argues
that more than fifty years after Brown and more than thirty years of
racial preferences have simply not been enough time for minorities
to attain meaningful socio-economic achievement in the profes
sional sphere. 502 This approach focuses on the disparate impact
theory, which states that disparities between whites and minorities
in employment rates, in themselves, warrant racial preference
plans. 503
The diversity proponents vilify the shameful role race has
played in the past, yet wish to re-institutionalize the same disgrace
ful regime today. While the African American story indeed depicts
a long and arduous struggle for liberty, the possibility of disciplining
those responsible is impossible. Discriminating against innocent
members of the majority further splits the racial chasm. Enlighten
ment philosophy teaches that individuals are free until they actually
hurt another or interfere with another's liberty. The stringent en
forcement of anti-discrimination laws preserves the proper balance
498. David Nachmias & David H. Rosenbloom, Measuring Bureaucratic Repre
sentation and Integration, in DIVERSITY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PUBLIC SERVICE
40 (Walter D. Broadnax ed., 2000).
499. See Lloyd G. Nigro, A Mini-Symposium, Affirmative Action in Public Em
ployment, in DIVERSITY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PUBLIC SERVICE 160-61 (Walter
D. Broadnax ed., 2000).
500. See Stephan Overell, An issue that is not black and white: Corporate Diver
sity: Is there really a business case for having a diverse workforce?, FIN. TIMES (London),
Feb. 21, 2005, at 11; Donna Howell, Work Force of the 21st Century: Is there a pot of
gold at the end of the diversity rainbow for large corporations?, INVESTORS BUSINESS
DAILY, June 20, 2005, at AlO.
501. See Foreman, Dadey & Wiggins, supra note 458, at 112-13.
502. Id. at 104-05.
503. Id. at 83-84.
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of liberty and equity. The equal protection of all must not be re
placed with the unequal protection of some.
A social order that penalizes those who do well in their profes
sional endeavors is a symptom of a dysfunctional culture. We
should aspire to live up to one of the most fundamental principles
of the civil rights movement, which was capsulized by the Reverend
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., when he espoused his hope that Ameri
cans wish to "[l]ive in a nation where they will not be judged by the
color of their skin but by the content of their character. "504 Conse
quently, the next time the opportunity emerges to halt the progress
of racial preferences into the public employment context, we, in the
spirit of Odysseus, should remain faithful to the rule of law as en
shrined in the federal constitution by leaning on and rowing hard.

504. Martin Luther King Jr., I Have a Dream Speech delivered at the Lincoln
Memorial (August 28, 1963) (transcript available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/
speeches/lhaveadream.htm).

